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law and economic change during the short 
twentieth century 
john henry schlegel 
At the beginning of the short twentieth century heavy, blue-collar industry 
dominated the physical economy. Railroads were the dominant form of 
continental transportation; the ocean liner (for passengers) and the freighter 
(for cargo) the only available form of intercontinental transportation. Radio 
was the new, wonderful, transformative industry, and national consumer 
brands were beginning their domination of the grocery store’s growing 
cornucopia. 
At the end of the century, service industries dominate the economy. 
Were there any notion of the physical economy, it would probably focus on 
multiple kinds of imported consumer goods. Continental transportation of 
goods is dominated by interstate trucking; that of passengers, by airplanes. 
The ocean liner has changed into a floating hotel called the cruise ship; 
intercontinental passengers travel by air and goods in large steel boxes on 
truly ungainly looking, specially designed container ships. The Internet 
qualifies as the new, wonderful, transformative industry, and produce from 
Latin America has begun to dominate the grocery store’s still expanding 
bounty. 
Looked at in a more schematic way, the story is the same. During years 
that witnessed an amazing growth in the administrative apparatus of all lev-
els of government, there simultaneously occurred three large-scale changes, 
three of those developments that somehow define eras. First, the middle class 
expanded to include a portion of the working class as part of a dominating 
consumer culture. Second, the imperial Northeastern manufacturing econ-
omy, the colonial Southern agricultural economy, and the colonial Western 
agricultural and natural resources economy all declined while simultane-
ously a lighter manufacturing economy in the South and West grew, as 
did a service economy throughout the country. And third, the American 
island economy that followed World War II declined as a significantly more 
international economy of manufacturing, finance, and, to a lesser extent, 
agriculture and natural resources took shape. 
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Surely then, these years have seen profound economic change. Yet in some 
ways, a concomitant change in the way that the economy is experienced, 
structured, thought of is equally important. At the beginning of the short 
twentieth century the model of a good economy was one in which groups 
of manufacturers or retailers believed that, by associating together with the 
objective of treating each other fairly, a high-price, high- wage economy 
could deliver prosperity for all. And during the Depression the federal 
government put into place a legal framework that could support such an 
associationalist economy. But by the end of that century, such a model was 
of interest only to historians. Its obliteration was so complete that many 
advocates of unionized labor had little understanding of how their language 
of fairness tied into a lost economic model dependent on local and regional 
oligopolistic conduct. In place of that model we now have a new one, based 
on atomized and decentralized production tied together with round-the-
clock instantaneous communication and with financial structures favoring 
very short time horizons, that has for its hallmark a collective obsession 
with speedy flexibility. 
What significance can we ascribe to law – by which I mean the many 
and variable actions undertaken by lawyers and other governmental officials, the 
formal and effective norms originating from the practices of these individuals, and 
the systematic presuppositions shared among them – in the extraordinary story of 
economic change that is the short twentieth century? I wish to argue that, 
properly understood, the answer to this question is “very little,” though a 
not unimportant “very little.” In so arguing, I am not to be understood as 
embracing either of the following perspectives on the general relationship 
of law and economy. First, law is not simply a prisoner of the market forces 
of a time and place. Nor, second, is it irrelevant except to the extent that 
it unwisely attempts to constrain market actors from pursuing their self-
interest. Rather, the pervasiveness of law in structuring the economy of this 
and any other set of years is or ought to be obvious to all but the most 
unreflective Marxist or vulgar free marketeer. Indeed, I would go so far as to 
assert that, at any given time and place, price – the efficient market solution 
to a question of demand and supply – is fully determined by law, seen as 
a set of legal entitlements, together with the set of resource endowments 
distributed among economic actors at that time and place. Moreover, any 
significant alteration in those legal entitlements will cause an alteration in 
that efficient market solution. However, questions about such, almost static 
equilibriums are not my concern here. Instead, I wish to talk about change, 
about movement from one economy to another. 
Then what do I mean by “an economy?” An economy, a persistent mar-
ket structure, is the fusion of an understanding of economic life with the patterns 
of behavior within the economic, political, and social institutions that enact that 
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understanding. Law contributes pervasively to any such understanding; it 
affirms, structures or restructures, and so, in an obviously separable sense, 
enacts, the relevant institutions that economic actors use when buying and 
selling, working and investing, as part of their daily life. But questions of 
economic change are not answered by summing all of the activities, includ-
ing legal change, that make up daily economic life. Economic change is the 
shift from one enacted (in both senses) understanding of economic life to 
another – in the case of the short twentieth century, from an associationalist 
economy to what I call an impatient economy. In this chapter I hope first 
to explicate this economic change, and then to interrogate it in order to 
1understand the role of law in its occurrence. 
I. THE TWENTIES AND THIRTIES: AN ASSOCIATIONALIST 
IDEAL 
At the end of World War I, the United States, which had just completed an 
extraordinary period of industrial expansion followed by one of industrial 
concentration, was the largest national economy in the world. Its greatest 
strength, aside from a substantial natural resource base, was its enormous 
domestic market tied together by a strong railroad network that allowed 
the country to be a relatively insolated, self-sufficient economic entity. This 
is not to say that the United States did not participate in international trade 
and finance. It was a key player in both areas. Rather, the size of the domestic 
market and its relative affluence meant that most manufacturers and many 
retailers had a market so large that they could grow to an enormous size 
based on transactions within the domestic economy alone, protected, of 
course, from foreign competition by relatively high trade barriers. 
Given these obvious advantages, the economy’s overall performance in 
the following two decades was surprisingly erratic, but overall disastrously 
weak. A sharp postwar inflationary spurt was followed first by an equally 
1 A word about periodization is in order. I take the twenties to extend from the end of 
the postwar demobilization – about 1919 – until the stock market crash in 1929. The 
thirties is a long period continuing until 1941 when, with the adoption of Lend-Lease, 
the U.S. economy was placed on a wartime footing. The forties extend only to 1947, the 
end of the post-war inflation. Then came the fifties. The sixties begin late – in 1962 – 
and end with the rise in oil prices that accompanied the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The 
seventies continue until the onset of the Reagan administration in 1981 or maybe until 
inflation finally turns down in the wake of the terrible recession of 1982. The eighties 
begin thereafter or possibly in 1979 when the Federal Reserve Board moved to contract 
the money supply sharply, and last until the end of the recession just before the start of 
the Clinton administration, that is the nineties. These are, I must emphasize, economic 
periods; I would identify social periods quite differently. 
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sharp recession and then by a somewhat frenetic period of genuine growth. 
Thereafter, a general recession that began just slightly before the famous 
stock market crash of October 1929 terminated a classic market bubble 
turned serious – turned into the Depression. Four years later, when the 
economy bottomed out, the unemployment rate was about 25 percent; 
prices, particularly of farm products, had declined significantly; mortgage 
foreclosures had hit record levels, as had bank failures; and not surprisingly, 
industrial production had plummeted as well. For the balance of the decade 
the economy grew slowly, interrupted only by a decline in 1937, though 
not to the level of its pre-Depression high. 
If one factors out the substantial amount of noise in the economic record 
of these years, several significant changes stand out. The most obvious is 
the growth of an extensive consumer electric (though surely not electronic) 
appliance industry led by radios, irons, vacuum cleaners, and to a much 
lesser extent refrigerators, as electrical service was extended to most urban 
and increasing numbers of rural households. Equally noticeable was the 
great expansion in automobile ownership, though here the impact of this 
growth was more significant in rural areas, where auto ownership provided 
a significant opportunity to reduce isolation, than in urban ones, where 
existing transit networks and shops within walking distance made the cost 
of ownership seem more of a barrier to purchase. 
More invisible, but in the long run equally significant, were two changes. 
The first was the slow development of the commercial aircraft industry 
whose major success with the DC-3 began the increase in air travel in the 
late thirties. The second was the expansion of consumer services, especially 
in the twenties, both in the financial area, with the growth of installment 
purchase of autos and appliances, and in retail trades of all kinds. Neverthe-
less, the economy of the Northeast still was dominated by heavy industrial 
production, such as steel, autos, and electrical machinery, and by rail trans-
port, all of which employed enormous numbers of blue-collar, variously 
skilled workers, pretty much in accordance with late-nineteenth-century 
industrial norms. The South was still largely an agricultural economy and 
the West an agricultural and mining economy. Both thus provided low-
value goods to feed Northeastern factories and mouths. The whole was 
stitched together with a railroad system that had reached its peak size just 
before the Great War and had begun to shrink in size thereafter. 
With immigration cut off, the ethnic makeup of the population was 
largely settled; immigrants and their families from Eastern and South-
ern Europe provided much of the workforce in the large industrial plants. 
This was the backbone of the working class. Northern Europeans provided 
much of the white-collar workforce, staff and line, that ran the predomi-
nantly dispersed, divisional structure of large industrial corporations. These 
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individuals were the dominant element in the middle and lower middle class 
that had come numerically to overwhelm the upper middle class of pro-
fessionals and local owners of shops and small factories. At the same time, 
the growth of line functions in large industrial corporations and of service 
industries brought an increase in female, particularly unmarried female, 
waged labor, beyond the traditional work in textiles and apparel. 
Such a structure to the economy was not wholly surprising, given the 
persistence of the remains of the large turn-of-the-century industry-specific 
mergers designed to create effective product monopolies. The surviving 
firms had, as a result of effective antitrust intervention during the Taft and 
Wilson administrations, devolved into relatively stable oligopolies that 
tended both to maintain their production processes and to grow vertically 
so as to control supplies and distribution. At the same time, “discounters” 
or “chain stores” – national retail organizations such as the Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Company (the A & P), Sears, Roebuck & Co., or Montgomery, 
Ward & Company – began to establish branches in order to infiltrate local 
retailing markets that previously were effectively insulated from compe-
tition by the still significant difficulties of greater than local passenger 
transportation. The simultaneous growth of distribution through nation-
ally controlled, locally franchised retailing organizations caused much con-
sternation to local elites unused to more than incidental competition at the 
retail level. As a result, these local elites began to utter the same variety of 
complaints about ruinous or destructive competition and predatory pricing 
that had been voiced by those large manufacturers who sought refuge in the 
great merger movement twenty-five years earlier. These complaints, which 
continued to be heard from producers in such more competitive industrial 
segments such as lumber, coal, and cement, coalesced in a movement that 
is commonly called associationalism. 
Many economic theorists who supported associationalism in the twenties 
and thirties believed that economic instability was the result of excess 
production of goods and services coupled with relentless downward pressure 
on producer prices caused by “chiselers” who reduced prices and otherwise 
“cut corners” for temporary personal advantage. These economists argued 
that downward pressure on prices could be resisted if producers banded 
together into groups that would work both to “coordinate” production 
(i.e., manage reduction and expansion) and to isolate and vilify chiselers, 
so as to enforce good – and thereby suppress “unfair” – trade practices. 
This theory also held that insufficient demand in poor times could be 
remedied by increasing employment and by providing Social Security and 
unemployment insurance so that the disposable income of wage earners, 
and thus demand, could be maintained: a Keynesian prescription before 
John Maynard Keynes produced his famous volume. 
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Associationalism was essentially a Main Street, though not therefore a 
small town, theory. It hoped to maintain high wages through the high prices 
that would support the small, local retail or wholesale businesses that were 
being undercut by the growth of large regional or national retailers, as well 
as the more competitive sectors of the producer economy. This design was for 
an economy of uniform, high prices, such as that found in more oligopolistic 
markets or as was enshrined in the steel industry’s basing-point price system 
whereby all steel prices were quoted as if the product were being shipped 
from Pittsburgh. It denied distant local producers locational monopoly 
pricing ability, but at the same time allowed them to make up in freight 
charges collected, but not incurred, the costs associated with their smaller 
scale, and so higher cost, production processes. 
Not laissez-faire in a different guise, associationalism assumed some level 
of governmental involvement in the economy, as befits a theory whose pub-
lic champion was Herbert Hoover, first as Secretary of Commerce under 
both Harding and Coolidge and then as president. Supported by the Federal 
Trade Commission, the theory received and required a crabbed construction 
of the antitrust laws so as to permit associations to perform their regulatory 
and disciplinary functions, as well as some legal support for suppressing 
unfair trade practices. It also seemed to require high trade protection for 
American industries, and indeed, these ideas are popularly associated with 
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. When reduced to legislation, associa-
tionalism regularly echoed Progressive concerns about the protection of 
small producers and ordinary workers, as can be seen in the “first” New 
Deal of the Roosevelt administration, in which associationalism spawned 
the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as well as 
such seemingly unrelated legislation as the Social Security Act, the Wagner 
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Federal Housing Act, and the 
Robinson-Patman Act. The prevalence of agricultural marketing cooper-
atives and state retail price maintenance statutes are of a piece. Surviving 
bits of the self-regulatory norm inherent in the theory still can be found in 
the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, and the numerous bodies setting industry standards that exist in fields 
such as plumbing and electrical equipment. The theory can even be seen in 
Karl Llewellyn’s early plans for the sales article of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
The accuracy of the associationalist diagnosis of the problems of business 
in the twenties and thirties is, for present purposes, unimportant. Accurate 
or not, the managed, associationalist market was a prominent economic 
ideal in the years between the wars. However, that ideal had another side 
to it. Stabilization of prices at high levels and control over the introduction 
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of innovation protected the market position of large producers as well as 
small retailers. For such producers, the theory could be seen as justify-
ing classic cartel behavior, behavior that in Europe led to collusion with 
large trades’ unions and to industry-wide bargaining, still epitomized by 
the metalworkers union in Germany. In the United States this variation 
on the cartel model supported the relatively static competitive position of 
participants in the more oligopolistic markets. Under oligopolistic com-
petition, leading firms in effect negotiated price publicly and then strove 
to avoid undercutting that price. Simultaneously, they used their research 
staffs and advertising to generate product differentiation that might alter 
market share in their favor, always dreading the possibility that a competi-
tor would develop a “breakthrough” product that could remake current, 
reasonably stable relationships in unforeseen ways. 
Although associationalism as a theory clearly preferred the private orga-
nization of markets implicit in the ideal of an association, it just as clearly 
recognized that stable economic relationships that yielded high prices, high 
wages, and continuous profits could be established by governmental reg-
ulation. Thus, it could support a regulatory response to the widely felt 
sense that a weak and speculative financial system was a contributor to the 
Depression. The extension of speculative credit, especially in the real prop-
erty and securities markets, was viewed as “unfair,” as were widespread self-
dealing, manipulation, and even fraud in bank lending practices and in the 
underwriting of securities issues and their trading in the stock market. The 
response at the federal level was the creation of significant federal legislation 
directed at boosting confidence in the financial system. The Glass-Steagall 
Act (Banking Act of 1933), requiring a separation of commercial from 
investment banking, and the legislation establishing the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Federal Farm Credit Administra-
tion were each designed to increase the soundness of the banking system by 
creating the stable, profitable relationships among the providers of a major 
source of credit for the economy that were favored by associationalism’s 
theorists. The legislation establishing the Securities Exchange Commission 
and securing for it the means for regulating the securities markets based on 
a principle of disclosure and of penalties for non-disclosure, including the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Invest-
ment Company Act, and the Trust Indenture Act, was structured similarly. 
Together such legislation was designed to strengthen those institutions 
essential for the credit and investment expansion that would undergird 
recovery, and, not incidentally, honestly finance both oligopolistic produc-
ers and Main Street merchants. 
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Law and Economic Change: An Initial Interrogation 
This brief recounting of the American economy in the twenties and thirties 
raises obvious questions about law and economic change. As one lists even 
a small part of the New Deal’s legislation, one can quickly identify the 
response of law to economic dislocation. Local relief efforts were supple-
mented with funds supplied by federal programs mounted by the Works 
Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, programs 
that are largely lost in any brief telling of the story of the economy in these 
years, but crucial for those whose hunger they reduced and shelter they 
supported. The great structural statutes in agriculture, banking, commu-
nications, labor, securities, and transportation that survived Supreme Court 
challenge, as well as those that did not – the National Recovery Act (NRA) 
and Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) – also exemplify the way that law 
is regularly mobilized in times of trouble. All were significant changes in 
the doctrinal matrix that is the law at a time and place. They can even be 
seen to have significantly aided the creation of the administrative state. But 
that said, the role that these statutes played in economic change remains 
unclear. 
Each changed the efficient market solution to a problem of supply and 
demand; that much is clear. Consider only two modest changes – the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and the Trust Indenture Act. Both were classic associ-
ationalist pieces of legislation based on its diagnosis of under-consumption 
as the root of economic weakness and its penchant for picking up on unfin-
ished Progressive causes. The first created the rule requiring time-and-a-
half for overtime for certain groups of workers. After adoption it could be 
expected that such a rule would, at the margin, make employers respond 
to the opportunity to increase production by relying less on extending the 
hours of existing workers and more on increasing total employment. At the 
same time, the Fair Labor Standards Act’s adoption of a firm rule worked 
toward minimizing the old problem of whether employers unfairly coerced 
employees to work long hours. The Trust Indenture Act yoked old problems 
even more directly to new objectives by establishing rules dictating “fairer” 
terms in the indentures that governed bond issues with respect to trustee 
selection, notice to bondholders, and their consent to the restructuring of 
bond obligations. Such statutory provisions were expected, again at the 
margin, to increase the willingness of investors to purchase bonds because 
they knew that their interests were better protected. However, the change 
in the efficient market solution to a problem of supply and demand at a 
hypothetical margin is like a tree falling in the forest unheard. Unless that 
margin is reached, legal change changes nothing in the economy. What 
passage of the law means is that a set of structures have been put into place 
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that may or may not become relevant under future economic conditions, 
dependent as they are on future political, technological, even demographic 
occurrences. 
But to notice the structural element in such legislation is to bring to 
the forefront the matter of the degree to which the New Deal statutory 
reforms enacted the associationalist economy. Here the answer is a resolute 
negative. The creation of potentially efficacious institutional structures is 
not enough to “enact” an economy. Consider the possibility that, contrary 
to fact, World War II had ended with a long-term truce among four or five 
countries whose manufacturing capacity remained in good shape and so 
whose economies competed vigorously. There is little reason to believe that 
in such circumstances, circumstances in which relative insulation from the 
world economy would decrease as air and ocean transportation improved, 
the margin where any of these statutes would bite would ever be reached. 
These laws might well have been of antiquarian interest, but little else. 
Indeed, their notoriety today is a function of the fact that at some point 
action within the institutions that they created actually took place, that the 
economic relations that they made possible came to pass. 
Note, however, that even though a change of behavior at the margin 
may never take place, a change in legal entitlements may easily work a 
change in the distribution of economic resources. The Fair Labor Standards 
Act immediately made some employees wealthier, those whose wage gains 
were less than the cost of hiring additional employees, especially where 
slack demand or capacity constraints effectively turned the choice to hire 
additional employees into the choice to begin a second shift. And this 
increase in disposable income of individual workers may well have been 
enough to alter, as always at the margin, the efficient market solution to 
other questions of supply and demand, most obviously those of clothing, 
food, and housing. But such an alteration is no more a change in an economy 
than would be the modest change in the market for legal services brought 
on by adoption of the Trust Indenture Act. Law changes lots of things in 
the details of economic life for the participants without bringing about a 
transformation of the economy from one enacted understanding of economic 
life to another. 
II. THE FORTIES AND FIFTIES: ASSOCIATIONALISM AT WORK 
Wartime mobilization and then production pulled the economy out of the 
Depression in ways that all the thinking and writing of economists and 
all the action of politicians could not manage. By taxing some, borrowing 
much, and spending it all to win the war, the United States adopted a 
Keynesian solution to its economic problems, but out of necessity, not out 
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of theoretical understanding, for such a theoretical solution was still rejected 
by most economists, as it had been during the Depression. 
Total war meant that there were jobs for virtually everyone not actively 
engaged in the armed forces. However, the rationing and price controlling 
of most consumer products, combined with the termination of produc-
tion of other products, meant that wartime wages were, by default, largely 
saved. The technological innovations that the war spawned were notable – 
synthetic rubber, radar, sonar, separation of uranium isotopes using the hex-
afluoride compound, and the vacuum-tube-dependent ENIAC computer – 
but changed the lives of Americans very little during those years. Much 
more significant was the wartime spread of military installations and, to a 
lesser extent, war production plants, in the South and West that over time 
began to break the agriculturally based colonial economy of the former and 
the natural resources and agriculture based colonial economy of the latter. 
Wartime economic practice continued to support the associationalist 
bent of the economic/legal understanding of the period that preceded it. 
Given the inflationary pressures that came with a sharp growth in total 
wages and the wartime price control mechanism that was designed to deal 
with those pressures, the existing structure of commercial relations was, if 
anything, reinforced. Not only did the large, established firms that secured 
the greatest portion of war-related contracts prosper, but also firm prices 
on rationed goods meant that small units of production and distribution 
prospered as well. The war may not have been won on Main Street, but Main 
Street prospered as much or more that it had in the very brief euphoria that 
was the economy of the twenties. 
Labor also prospered. Though wage increases were drastically limited 
under the War Labor Board’s fabled “Little Steel formula,” at least union 
recognition and bargaining over working conditions were ensured. Strikes, 
like wages, were limited, at least in theory. In practice the incidence of strikes 
increased over the course of the war. However, out of the wartime experience 
both labor and management started down the road toward understanding 
that the country preferred industrial peace at a modest price. Acceptable 
were increased costs from modest wage increases, from the introduction of 
non-wage benefits, from the recognition of work rules that kept production 
expensive but labor less onerous (a covert form of a wage increase), and from 
the proliferation of by law guaranteed time-and-a-half overtime, the major 
source of increased prosperity for workers. 
Overseas, American aircraft were attempting to destroy both European 
and Japanese industrial might while allied diplomats planned for a postwar 
international order, efforts that at Dumbarton Oaks led to the creation of 
the United Nations and at Bretton Woods to the outline of a new economic 
order. The Bretton Woods agreements reestablished the fixed rate regime for 
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foreign exchange that Roosevelt had interred when he took the United States 
off the gold standard in 1933. Under the Bretton Woods gold exchange 
standard, the United States agreed to exchange dollars for gold, but only 
in transactions with foreign central banks, at a rate of $35 per ounce. The 
currencies of the other states that participated in the system were then tied to 
the dollar or gold at fixed rates, and states agreed to maintain their currency 
within a band (generally, 1 percent) of the fixed rate. The International 
Monetary Fund, also established at Bretton Woods, was designed to lend 
money to states that had insufficient gold or foreign currency reserves to 
keep the actual value of their currency at the agreed-on rate, usually because 
of an inability to cover their trade deficits. 
At the end of the war, Europe, even victorious Great Britain, was prostrate 
with a combination of significant population loss, destruction or exhaus-
tion of industrial plant and equipment, destruction of infrastructure, and 
removal of captive sources of raw materials. Indeed, the destruction had 
been so severe that economic conditions throughout the continent were 
worse in 1947 than they had been in 1945. Only with the Communist 
takeovers of countries in Eastern Europe did economic conditions begin to 
pick up when, in response, the United States began to pour into Western 
Europe economic aid under the Marshall Plan and military aid, always a 
prop to an economy, under NATO. Still, even with all this aid, Europe and 
comparatively less aided Japan were restarting their economies from a very 
low level. 
In contrast, the United States had won all the marbles. As the only 
truly functioning major economy north of the equator, it held virtually all 
economic power in its hands and thought that it held all political power as 
well. Like Julius Caesar, it bestrode “the narrow world like a Colossus.” The 
returning GIs cared little about such things, however; they needed jobs. 
Their needs brought about the replacement of women workers with men 
in many of the best paying jobs, though only a temporary decline in female 
participation in the waged workforce. The development of an ideology in 
support of this maneuver exalted the notion of the one-wage-earner family 
supported by a “family wage.” Although the decline of overtime in the 
immediate post-war years initially made the notion of the family wage quite 
difficult to achieve, the GI Bill, for a time at least, served to sop up much 
potential unemployment, with its extension of benefits for servicemen who 
sought further education, particularly higher education, which the colleges 
were quick to supply. 
Immediately after the war, the rise in consumer demand – fueled first 
by the simple absence of goods and services during the war, second by the 
disproportionately large savings that were accumulated in those years when 
high wages could find few goods to purchase, and finally by the developing 
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baby boom – brought significant inflation. But by 1947 inflation subsided, 
with only a modest spurt in 1950 associated with the onset of the Korean 
War. Housing and autos then led the postwar economic expansion. In 
addition, the United States was exporting goods, including farm products, 
at a very high level. These exports earned large, if not wholly meaningful, 
trade surpluses; they were financed with aid or credit from the federal 
government, for there was little that European countries and Japan had to 
export. 
America’s military and economic spending in Europe, the same kind 
that drove the American economy during the war, was modestly helpful 
in supporting domestic postwar expansion. The reintroduction of wartime 
production that accompanied the Korean War meant that large-scale gov-
ernment stimulation of the economy returned for the better part of four 
years; it was accompanied by another dose of somewhat less generous GI 
Bill benefits. But Korea was not fought under conditions of “total war.” 
This time consumption was not particularly squeezed as a result of war 
mobilization. 
The economy grew strongly during these war years and continued its 
growth into its next decade. Purchasing power was reasonably stable after 
1950; capital, reasonably plentiful; consumer goods, everywhere to be 
found; foreign sales, large. Only agriculture seemed to lag. Farm employ-
ment continued its wartime decline; farm size, its wartime increase; farm 
income, its relative stagnation. This is not to say that in urban areas the 
great postwar expansion was inexorably upward. Indeed, there were three 
modest recessions during the chronological fifties, the last coming at the 
end of the decade and contributing to the election of a Democratic admin-
istration in 1960. But these were rightly seen as good years by consumers, 
wage earners, and businessmen, fueled, as they were, by the insulation of 
the domestic economy from international competition originating in the 
still recovering European and Japanese economies and by the interaction 
of this insulation with the practices of the associationalist legal/economic 
model of a good economy. 
The lack of international competition meant that American industry 
could raise wages and easily pay for such wage increases by raising prices 
modestly, relying on increases in demand to lower unit costs, and by defer-
ring improvements in production processes, plant, and equipment. Nor was 
there any internal need to do otherwise. Industry-wide bargaining meant 
that competitors were seldom differentially disadvantaged by increases in 
wages, increases that to some extent may have reflected productivity gains. 
The prices of non-labor product inputs were reasonably steady, and domestic 
companies controlled access to most raw materials, particularly petroleum, 
at low world prices. And stockholders were a quiescent, dispersed lot, as 
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Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means had observed a generation earlier, who 
looked primarily for predictable dividends and less for capital appreciation. 
Disgruntled investors sold; they did not fight management. 
The continued authority of the associationalist ideal of managed, rather 
than ruinous, competition seemingly protected retail business owners, 
though here the development of new national chains, such as McDonald’s 
and Holiday Inn, and the expansion of discounting beyond groceries into 
hard goods ought to have given careful observers pause. And that ideal 
similarly protected members of the numerous oligopolistic industries by 
limiting them to “gloves on” competitive fights for market share. American 
industry had become big, cumbrous, comfortable, and more dependent 
for its prosperity on the gross level of demand derived from increases 
in total employment than on product improvement derived from capital 
investment. 
In some ways the quiescent state of American industry in these years 
is somewhat counterintuitive. At the same time that producers were insu-
lated from international competition to their products, capital costs were 
unusually low because the United States maintained a sheltered market in 
credit growing out of the structure that New Deal legislation left behind. 
Checking account demand deposits were largely limited to corporations and 
upper- or upper-middle-class families, and there were few equally liquid 
investments offered elsewhere. Securities were effectively purchased by a 
similarly limited group, due in part to high and fixed minimum brokerage 
commissions and in part to a lingering fear of the stock market that many 
middle-class people had learned from the Great Crash. Savings for most 
people were channeled into time deposit savings accounts, often at savings 
and loan associations that were statutorily limited to paying low rates of 
interest – 2 or 3 percent for most of these years – and similarly limited in 
their investment of these funds to home mortgages, often insured under 
the FHA or the GI bill. This segmentation of the national pool of savings 
provided support for the housing markets, as well as a pile of corporate 
bank balances available for lending to corporate borrowers at rates that 
were secure from serious competition from the long-term, debt-oriented 
securities markets. 
One might have expected that the relatively low cost of credit would 
have brought forth a torrent of investment in new product development, 
old product innovation, and improvement of production processes to make 
up for the lack of such investment since 1929. But this did not happen on a 
grand scale. Innovation was obvious in the mass production of the primarily 
suburban, new housing modeled on Levittown and in air conditioning, 
television, and stereo. But the results of a lack of innovation were also already 
evident. In iron and steel, little significant investment in new processes 
576 John Henry Schlegel 
was made after the Korean War. In rails, new investment was limited to 
replacing steam with diesel power. This obvious improvement in technology 
drew attention away from the continuing decline in demand, both in terms 
of passengers and freight, that the boom in heavy transport during World 
War II had obscured. Passenger rail travel declined with the proliferation of 
private autos and later with the growth of business air travel; freight declined 
with the increasing availability of truck transport, a circumstance obvious 
even before the war. Indeed, the plans for what became the Eisenhower 
Interstate Highway System in 1957 were first drafted in 1941. At that 
time the proposal was advanced on precisely the twin grounds successfully 
offered sixteen years later – national defense and highway congestion from 
increasing truck traffic. 
The social consequence of what in retrospect was a hot-house economy, 
insulated from competition abroad and limited in competitive pressures at 
home, was a dramatic increase in the middle class, both white collar and 
blue. This larger middle class was built on three things: reasonably high 
wages; low housing costs, aided by the nationwide adoption of the fully 
amortizable, thirty-year mortgage (introduced on a mass scale by federal 
agencies during the Depression) available at interest rates intentionally 
kept low by the structure of banking regulation and effectively lowered 
even further by the tax deductibility of mortgage interest in a time of high 
marginal tax rates; and the extension of college education – more a matter 
of increasing status than improving skills – to groups that previously would 
never have been able to afford it. This was the “Quiet Generation,” quiet 
because times were good and families needed building. 
These new, middle-class Americans, still segregated by income, sought to 
leave their familiar urban neighborhoods for the suburbs. Their reasons for 
doing so were many and conflicting. They sought to escape the rising tide of 
black migration to Northern cities that had picked up during the war and 
further increased with changes in Southern agricultural practices, such as 
the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, that made the sharecrop-
per’s or tenant farmer’s already precarious livelihood even more fragile. They 
also sought to escape the family pressure that was omnipresent in old eth-
nic neighborhoods of multiple family dwellings wedged closely together. 
Especially, they hoped to fulfill that quintessential American dream, sold 
endlessly in the popular press as well as by producer advertising, of owning 
one’s own home. In their separate suburban enclaves, often still as sepa-
rated by ethnicity, as well as race, as were their old neighborhoods, these 
individuals created a middle class that was both different from that of the 
classic bourgeois shopkeeper or professional of nineteenth-century Europe 
and America or from that of the salaried middle management ubiquitous 
in corporate life since the latter part of that century, and far larger in scope 
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than had ever been seen before. They were the first wage-earner middle 
class. 
Meanwhile, the combination of Marshall Plan aid and NATO-related 
expenditures in Europe and similar economic aid and Korean-War-related 
expenditures in Japan, plus low domestic defense expenditures in both areas 
and incredibly high savings rates in Japan meant first slow, then explosive 
growth in the mid-fifties. As a result of this growth, the American balance of 
trade, the measure of current exports as against imports, which had regularly 
shown a surplus, began to decline. Consequently, given the continuation of 
governmental expenditures abroad, largely military after economic aid was 
ended in the early fifties, the declining positive balance of trade allowed 
the development of a negative balance of payments, the measure of total 
currency and gold outflows as against inflows. 
Initially, that negative balance of payments was good for a world economy 
that was short of payment reserves. It allowed foreign countries to build 
up reserves, particularly of dollars, the reserve currency of choice. However, 
by the late fifties, what was once a good thing and remained so because 
an increase in reserves was essential for financing the continuing growth 
in international trade, given that a sufficient increase in the gold supply 
was not forthcoming, also came to be seen as troublesome. The first call 
on the American gold reserve was as fractional backing for the dollar as a 
domestic currency. The balance of the reserve was, under the gold exchange 
standard, held to guarantee the American pledge to redeem in gold the 
dollar holdings of foreign governments at the $35 per ounce ratio set by 
the Bretton Woods agreements. This guarantee of redemption was fine, so 
long as no foreign government sought to exercise the right to redeem its 
dollar holdings. Unfortunately, foreign governments did just that, and the 
gold reserve slowly was being depleted. 
With outstanding dollar reserves exceeding the gold available to back 
them, the possibility that someone would be left without a chair when 
the music stopped began to worry foreign governments. These govern-
ments feared that the United States would devalue its currency, unilaterally 
increasing the price of gold and hence the amount of foreign dollar hold-
ings required to be exchanged for a given amount of gold. At the same 
time, the U.S. government feared that devaluing the dollar would both 
spark domestic inflation and bring about an international economic crisis 
that could undermine the strength of the anti-Communist coalition that 
seemed essential for Western security. Thus began a period of intense offi-
cial concern about the balance of trade, balance of payments, dollar outflow, 
current account, and other measures of a “problem” that most Americans 
couldn’t understand, in part because the language used to describe the 
problem was so multifarious. 
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The first concrete and separable manifestation of that problem came in 
the early sixties. With the gradual opening of capital markets worldwide, 
European companies discovered that they could take advantage of a reg-
ulated American banking market that, because of the New Deal reforms, 
kept capital costs low in the United States, significantly lower than they 
were in Europe. These companies would borrow dollars in New York and 
use them to pay for capital investments abroad. Such a sensible business 
strategy had the obvious effect of increasing the supply of dollars abroad, a 
private outflow of capital on top of the governmental outflow for military 
and aid purposes, and so of increasing the balance of payments deficit and 
concomitant worries about the American gold reserve. In 1962, in an effort 
to reduce that outflow and the accompanying worries, the Kennedy admin-
istration introduced the interest equalization tax. This tax was designed to 
increase the effective interest rate on bonds denominated in dollars and sold 
in the United States by foreign borrowers to the interest rate that would 
have been paid on similar bonds had they been sold in foreign markets, and 
so to discourage the issuance of such bonds, by taxing American purchasers 
of the bonds. 
The temporary success of this tax strategy is far less important to under-
standing the American economy in the immediate postwar period than two 
other things. First, the need to impose the tax serves to mark a significant 
change in that economy. For the first time in more than twenty years inter-
national economic activities were having a negative impact on management 
of the American economy. The interest equalization tax affirmed, though 
no one understood this at the time, that the United States was no longer 
an economic island. Domestic economic policies would thereafter have to 
be recognized as having international effects and foreign economic policies 
recognized as having domestic economic effects. 
Second, although the imposition of the equalization tax largely ended 
the market for bonds denominated in dollars and sold in the United States 
by foreign borrowers, it did not dampen the demand of foreign corporations 
for dollar-denominated loans. Governments may have been worried about 
the American balance of payments, but borrowers were not. So, the market 
merely moved elsewhere – to the Eurodollar market, which is to say, really 
nowhere. That market, apparently born in the mid-fifties when the Russian 
government wanted a place to keep its dollar earnings where the American 
government could not confiscate them, lends dollars deposited in banks 
located in various countries in which the dollar is not the national currency. 
Somewhat unaccountably, such deposits are not subject to bank reserve 
requirements, which means that these lenders can offer lower interest rates 
than would be asked for loans in their various national currencies. Though 
such rates were not as low as American rates, the difference was still sufficient 
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to be attractive to European borrowers, and so in time these deposits grew 
enormously. The growth of this market affirmed the dollar’s central role in 
trade and investment worldwide, and, paradoxically, its role as an effective 
reserve currency, even as governments were worried about its “soundness.” 
After all, the United States was still the largest economy in the world. 
Law and Economic Change: A Second Interrogation 
The most obvious indication that one is confronting an economy in full 
bloom, as it were, is that as one tries to tell its story there is almost nothing 
to talk about for there is almost nothing going on. The economic actors 
have settled into playing the economic roles that the economy seems to 
assume that they will play. Law is quite silent as well. Such is the case with 
the associationalist economy of the fifties. 
After the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, there is but one 
significant piece of economic legislation in the succeeding fifteen years – 
the Interstate Highway Act of 1957. And that piece of legislation is more 
of a reflection of the impatience of the enlarged middle class with the limits 
on their ability to use their big cars and leisure time, their two weeks of paid 
vacation, than a reflection of any troubles that would cause those harmed to 
run to law for its uncertain succor. All of this is not to say that the organs 
of law shut down during these years. Rather, the legislative product – the 
expansion of the rice support program to two more counties in Arkansas 
where the existence of such support made it newly plausible to grow rice or 
the creation of a public authority to extend an airport or maintain a port – 
was so trivial as to beggar the mind. 
The relative silence of law is, of course, misleading. Narrowly conceived 
as just the formal and effective norms originating from governmental enti-
ties, especially the law of property, contract and theft, of mine and thine, 
law is always there, the modest hum of a faithful dynamo. Looking at law 
more broadly conceived, as the many and variable actions undertaken by 
governmental actors, of discretionary action, as the traditional language 
of the law would have it, the matter is pretty much the same. Because in 
an enacted economy the formal and effective structures are pretty much in 
place, the work of the bureaucracy goes about its modest regulatory business 
constantly, but quietly. Yes, noise is always heard from narrowly interested 
parties and that noise bulks large in the business press, but when looked back 
on, tempests and teapots come readily to mind. This is the real significance 
of the interest equalization tax, buried as it was in an otherwise ordinary 
omnibus tax bill. Law was finally roused from its quiet work to attend to 
what in the longer run turned out to be a significant problem. The associ-
ationalist economy was in trouble. 
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III. THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES: A TROUBLED ECONOMY 
For about the next twenty years, an increasingly troubled economy, centered 
in the production of consumer and heavy industrial goods, alternately slid 
and lurched down hill. How troubled? After the invasion of the Volkswagen 
Beetle, it took a flotilla of inexpensive Japanese imports to begin to knock 
the automobile industry out of denying that its market had changed. 
“Voluntary” export restraints entered into by Japanese manufacturers, de-
signed to give the industry time to get back to its fighting weight, seemed 
not to help. Then there was the continuous decline of a steel industry that, 
once deprived of the stimulus provided by the Vietnam War and plagued 
with excess capacity devoted to an aged production process, ceded market 
after market to substantially cheaper imports and domestic upstarts, even 
while receiving trade protection. Similar stories might be told in the case of 
textiles (again despite significant trade protection), machine tools, clothing, 
footwear, and, of course, the television set, that quintessential product of 
the fifties life and economy. Most of the areas in which significant declines 
did not occur were industries where comprehensive federal or state regula-
tion was in place, such as aviation, banking, communications, power, and 
securities. The only real growth industries in this period, other than enter-
tainment, were real estate, plus the associated construction enterprises, and 
higher education, plus the associated spinoffs from the production of tech-
nological research conducted in medicine, electronics, and other science-
and engineering-related fields. 
How did this state of affairs come about? Initially, foreign manufactured 
products were attractive simply because they were cheaper. The associa-
tionalist model of a high-wage, high-price economy made it difficult for 
newly prosperous younger and lower-middle-class consumers, the expanded 
middle class that the fifties economy brought into being, to afford many 
things, especially small appliances and other electrical goods, or much of 
many things that were affordable only in small amounts, mainly soft goods. 
The discount stores that had begun to appear in the fifties – stores like E. J. 
Korvettes that sold American made hard goods at “discount” (i.e., less than 
the high “list” prices charged by the small Main Street retailers) – soon 
turned into specialty retailers, such as Pier 1, or into moderate-income 
department stores, such as K-Mart, Ames, or Hills, that sold many foreign-
made goods, first soft goods, later small appliances, eventually electronics. 
Now, these families could have more clothes in their closets and small, 
inexpensive appliances in their kitchens; eventually they could have cheaper 
electronics in their family rooms. 
Foreign products, especially soft goods, small appliances, and consumer 
electronics, often were cheaper simply because of wage rate disparities. 
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For other products such as steel and autos, lower wages combined with 
an unexpected advantage that derived from the wartime destruction of 
industrial capacity in Europe and Japan. Overseas, once capital could be 
assembled to revive these industries, capacity was built with the newest, 
most efficient technology and work processes – production methods in 
advance of those existing in the United States. The combination of better 
methods and lower wages was sufficient to offset the quite significant cost 
of ocean freight for heavy, often bulky goods. Transportation costs for soft 
goods, small appliances, and consumer electronics, when combined with loss 
or damage from trans-shipping to boats and from boats to trains or trucks, 
were a similarly significant expense. But, in time, transportation costs for 
these goods came down radically with the development of containerized 
shipping and of ships designed for containerization. 
Eventually, foreign manufactured products were attractive because they 
were better. As foreign wages rose, first in Europe and then in Japan, pro-
ducers there relied on technological advances that reduced costs or on mass 
production of new products – the Walkman stereo and the videocassette 
recorder are the best known – often actually invented in the United States. 
Faced with persistent consumer demand for low- priced or relatively inex-
pensive newly available products, American companies, used to oligopolis-
tic competition, were not able, or at least not willing, to compete. Their 
response was to cede the low price market, as the steel industry had done, or 
to move production overseas. In either case, American companies eventu-
ally shrank domestic manufacturing capacity. Only later was “automation,” 
the choice to substitute increasingly sophisticated machines (often manu-
factured abroad) for labor power, tried and then only sometimes success-
fully. 
Explaining this pattern of manufacturer behavior is difficult. In some of 
the heavily unionized sectors such as steel and autos, management – fat, 
happy, and always inordinately concerned about its prerogatives; labor – a 
relatively immobile factor of production that can be expected to fight hard 
to preserve jobs; and especially poor labor-management relations, forged 
from the notion of quid pro quo, rather than the notion of joint problem 
solving, bear some share of the responsibility. In other unionized and in non-
unionized sectors, family and management ties to declining enterprises, a 
sense of obligation toward local communities, possibly a sense of continuing 
obligation to workers derived from their status as veterans, and of course 
drift and default seem to have played a role. What is most significant, 
however, is that, in a surprisingly large number of cases, plant closure was 
avoided for as long as possible. Such was the strength of the associationalist 
model in the late sixties and seventies, long after it ceased its relevance to 
America’s place in the world economy. 
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While the dysfunctional post-fifties American economy slid comfortably 
downhill, five developments silently continued to transform the country. 
The first was the malling of suburbia. This process largely destroyed the 
existing suburban versions of Main Street and continued the retail evacua-
tion of the urban business core that had begun with the accelerated growth 
of the suburbs in the fifties, a development that only hastened the residential 
evacuation of those same cities. 
The second development accompanied the completion of the interstate 
highway system. Initially, the existence of these highways magnified the 
evacuation of urban areas by their white, newly middle-class population. 
Then, in the same way that the new highway system had opened large 
tracts of land for residential development, it opened similar tracts for the 
development of light industrial and expanding service employment, par-
ticularly in banking, insurance, and health care, all within easy reach of this 
new suburban housing. Thereafter, jobs followed housing and housing jobs 
in a reinforcing cycle that created new suburban communities. Unlike the 
upper-middle-class suburbs of the twenties and thirties, these new suburbs 
were surprisingly independent of the urban areas that had initially spawned 
them. 
The third development was the continuation of the evacuation of rural 
America, especially the Midwestern breadbasket. Though federal subsidies 
kept agriculture profitable, as farms increased in scale to pay for increas-
ingly expensive hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, and equipment, the farm 
population declined. During these years, it was a real achievement for a 
rural community simply to maintain its population, even with recruited 
industrial employment, usually from firms attempting to escape a union-
ized work force, unless luck placed a growth industry – higher education 
was the most obvious one – in the area. 
The fourth development was the growth of the South and West. In the 
South, the out-migration of blacks displaced by the mechanization of agri-
culture was offset by an even larger in-migration of Northerners escaping 
declining industries and chasing manufacturing jobs that were fleeing union 
labor contracts. In the West, aerospace and other military-related jobs were 
the draw. In both areas, the climate was made increasingly habitable by the 
perfection of air conditioning. And, as cities grew, construction and service 
jobs grew in tandem. 
The fifth development was a significant change in the structure of the 
American industrial firm. Traditionally, industrial corporations, vertically 
integrated to a significant extent, made one major product and a few 
closely related ones. Such firms grew from the investment of retained earn-
ings, either internally or by merger with other firms in the same indus-
try. But in the sixties this type of growth by merger was stymied by the 
Law and Economic Change During the Short Twentieth Century 583 
Celler-Kefauver amendments to the antitrust acts. Apparently responding 
to this limit on growth, many American corporations began to use their 
retained earnings, in the form of new issues of common stock, to purchase 
strikingly diverse businesses, building what were called “conglomerates,” 
the most famous being Harold Geneen’s ITT and James Ling’s LTV. This 
innovation unfortunately coincided with a steep decline in average annual 
increases in American productivity, from about 3 percent in the late fifties 
to nearly zero percent by the end of the seventies, and in corporate spending 
for research and development. For the time being, it seemed as if the tra-
ditional industrial corporation, already under siege by foreign competitors, 
would be succeeded by another form of industrial organization. 
The slow slide of the American economy downhill that accompanied 
these social and economic changes was occasionally interrupted by less gen-
tle lurches toward the bottom. The first such lurch followed from Lyndon 
Johnson’s decision simultaneously to fight a land war in Asia, build a Great 
Society, and maintain the free importation of goods lest the American stan-
dard of living decline, but not to raise income taxes – a policy that Richard 
Nixon continued, though by diverting Great Society expenditures, and 
more than a few others, to the cause of Mars. Thus began a string of federal 
governmental deficits at a time when the economy was probably already 
operating at full capacity. 
Unfortunately, during these years the Federal Reserve had adopted a 
policy of seeking regular growth in the money supply, further augmenting 
that supply during each recession under the Keynesian theory, by then 
generally accepted, that such action would lower interest rates and so expand 
employment. The result was the beginning of the Great Inflation, lasting 
close to a generation. By the time this event was over, it had reduced 
the value of the dollar by about two-thirds and the real value of wages by 
20 percent. The newly broadened middle class was being seriously squeezed 
as interest rates increased significantly, especially on home mortgages; as 
the cost of common services, such as hair cuts and dry cleaning, not to 
mention more complex services such a medical care, began to accelerate; 
and as prices in the grocery and drug stores moved from a trot to a gallop. 
The combination of inflation and a system of fixed exchange rates occa-
sioned the second lurch downhill. Domestic inflation meant that, from the 
perspective of foreign buyers, American exports seemed more expensive; 
from the perception of American buyers, foreign imports seemed cheap. 
This disparity of perception led to a sharp deterioration in the American 
balance of trade as foreign buyers cut back on the purchase of American 
goods and American buyers clamored for more imported goods. Simulta-
neously, the further restrictions on the outflow of funds that were imposed 
soon after the interest equalization tax not only failed to solve the American 
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balance of payments problems, but those problems were augmented by the 
increased overseas military spending occasioned by the Vietnam War. This 
augmentation compounded the effects of the deterioration in the balance 
of trade; foreign governments began quickly to convert their dollars into 
gold. In 1971, fearing that continuation of the outflow of gold threatened 
the “bankruptcy” of the country or, more properly, of the policy of guaran-
teeing the convertibility of dollars into gold at the fixed rate established by 
the Bretton Woods agreements, Richard Nixon, who had more than exacer-
bated the problem by intensifying the war in Southeast Asia, “temporarily” 
refused to honor the nation’s commitment to exchange dollars for gold. Two 
years later, when circumstances had not improved, he abandoned the gold 
exchange standard entirely. 
The demise of the gold exchange standard and its replacement with 
a system of “floating” exchange rates involving the major international 
currencies – rates determined in the market for foreign exchange and not 
by the willingness of governments to exchange currency at stated rates – 
was not the disaster for the world economy that many had feared it would 
be. Indeed, like the interest equalization tax, the adoption of a floating 
exchange rate may have been more a symbol of the continued decline of 
the American island economy that had made possible the realization of the 
associationalist ideal in the fifties than of much practical significance, given 
that the dollar continued to be freely accepted as a medium of foreign trade 
and indeed, as a reserve currency. But everyone expected that the short-term 
consequence for the economy would be a further increase in inflation. 
Recognizing this expectation, when Nixon closed the gold window in 
1971, he simultaneously took the unprecedented step of instituting wage 
and price controls in an allegedly peacetime economy. Such controls were 
anything but unwelcome to the American people, unused as they were to 
annual inflation rates of 6 or more percent. In addition to placing stress on 
family budgets, such inflation even decreased disposable inflated income, 
as wage increases were also eaten into by increases in marginal income tax 
rates as a result of moving to higher tax brackets. Controls, progressively 
weakened, were about as effective as could be expected, more so possibly 
because they were not in force long enough to spawn a fully developed black 
market. 
Inflation, however, continued unabated. Indeed, next the economy expe-
rienced two more lurches toward the bottom, each accompanied by a sig-
nificant increase in inflation. In 1973 came the Arab oil embargo that 
followed the Yom Kippur War, which when lifted was accompanied by the 
decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to 
quadruple the price of oil. The unemployment rate hit 8.5 percent. Then, 
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in 1978 came a second shock, that from the loss of access to Iranian oil in 
the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and from the further OPEC price 
rise that followed. Because the United States had become highly dependent 
on importing countless tankers of now very expensive oil, its balance of 
trade, already significantly negative, declined precipitously, and soon the 
world was awash with dollars. 
Curiously, during these years, the most extraordinary – but usually unre-
marked – aspect of the American economy was the general inability of 
economists and policymakers to explain persuasively, much less to act effec-
tively to alter, the cumulative slide in that economy. How it came to be that 
inflation did not bring economic growth, its traditional accompaniment, 
but instead allowed the continuance of a relatively stagnant economy – the 
dreaded “stagflation” – was a mystery. And not a pleasant one. The largest 
economy in the world was in real trouble. 
Law and Economic Change: A Third Interrogation 
Watching an economy come apart is not likely to be a pretty sight, and the 
disintegration of the associationalist economy during the sixties and seven-
ties was no exception to this generalization. The bewildered, human pain 
that followed as solid expectations of future life were completely unrav-
eled – labor, management, adolescents, and old people alike in their pain, 
though not in their loss – is perhaps the most characteristic aspect of these 
years. Gasoline wasn’t supposed to cost a dollar a gallon; wages weren’t 
supposed to lag behind inflation; imports weren’t supposed to threaten 
established supports of community life. And this disorientation included 
public life; America wasn’t supposed to be a pitiful, helpless giant suffering 
from economic malaise, as Jimmy Carter learned to his dismay. 
That the experts could make no sense of these events is an understatement. 
Arthur Laffer could take a cocktail napkin, draw a curve on it that linked 
declining income tax rates with increasing tax collections, and it became a 
theory, somehow just as strong a theory as Milton Friedman’s theory about 
changes in the growth of monetary aggregates and inflation, based as his 
was on years of research in monetary history. Ideas for taming inflation as 
sensible, but unprecedented, as Richard Nixon’s embrace of peacetime price 
regulation and as silly as Gerald Ford’s distribution of WIN (Whip Inflation 
Now) buttons were both worth a try because no one could understand what 
was going on anyway. Maybe a conglomeration of companies was a good 
idea if a group could be assembled so that the profits of its component parts 
experienced different temporal cycles, some always up when the others 
were down, so that the company as a whole always would be profitable. But 
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then, maybe it was really dumb to assume that management by financial 
statement was better than management from the factory floor. Either was 
obviously arguable. 
Law understood no more than the humans who used it. People felt pain, 
felt the times to be out of control, and so went to law in search of whatever 
nostrums seemed plausible at a given time and place. Trade protection made 
as much sense as did abandoning the gold standard as did reinvigorating 
antitrust enforcement as did price control as did price decontrol as did the 
strategic petroleum reserve as did airline price deregulation. As was the 
case during the Depression, people were hurting, and so law responded in 
such ways as the practical politics of the legislative process at that time and 
place allowed. 
But to mention airline deregulation, a piece of the puzzle that only fit into 
a, not the pattern years later, is to bring to the fore something very important 
with respect to law and economic change. Although sensible people might 
have understood that the associationalist economy was coming apart and 
was not likely to be put together again, no one knew what kind of economy 
was in our future or even when a new economy might come together. No set 
of structures was put into place, intentionally or accidentally, that forged 
the next economy, except in the sense that lots of structures were tried that 
might or might not prove important depending on what happened next in 
economic life. The two nostrums that proved to be harbingers of things to 
come, the laughable Laffer curve and the deregulation of airline fares, do not 
bulk particularly large in any sensible story of these years. Indeed, it is hard 
to see exactly what the notion that raising the effective return on invested 
capital would aid the economy had to do with the notion that reducing 
price rigidity would have the same effect, except on the goofy theory, belied 
by the good years that were the fifties, that governmental regulation was 
somehow always and everywhere an economic mistake. 
IV. THE EIGHTIES AND NINETIES: BUILDING AN IMPATIENT 
ECONOMY 
One day in October 1979, Paul Volcker, newly chair of the Federal Reserve, 
decided that he had had it with inflation. He convinced the Fed to scrap 
the conventional wisdom; it would no longer increase the monetary supply 
in order to stimulate the economy and would let interest rates rise and 
fall as they pleased. Soon, interest rates hit sky-high levels, and in 1981 
the country dropped into a deep recession that lasted for two years. The 
unemployment rate reached 10 percent. About the same time, Ronald 
Reagan both increased defense spending and cut taxes, producing enormous 
deficits in the federal budget. These actions helped pull the economy out 
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of the recession that Volcker had created, once again proving that Keynes 
was most useful to those who did not believe in his prescriptions. 
When the recession was over, the Great Inflation was over as well. Appar-
ently, the precipitous rise in nominal interest rates in the early eighties 
interacted with a rise in real rates of return to boost the attractiveness of 
investment in capital assets and bring a decline in the actual rate of inflation. 
Such assets, especially those implementing newly developed technologies 
often related to computerization in both manufacturing and service indus-
tries, changed the structure of production. They tended either to increase 
the entry-level skills needed to operate production processes and so widened 
the gap between those skills, and the wages appropriate to them, and the 
remaining grunt jobs, or, as was particularly the case in the service sector, 
decreased the skill level and often the absolute number of entry-level jobs. 
In either case, the associationalist model of the economy was undercut. 
A similar undercutting was felt in diverse segments of the economy. 
Among the ideas offered in the seventies to explain the dismal condition 
of the economy was the proposition that it was rooted in excessive reg-
ulation. Although the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy – 
communications, energy, and transportation – were few in number and 
generally entailed only modest direct costs for industrial producers, and 
the more lightly regulated sectors – banking and securities – arguably had 
been a crucial economic engine during the fifties by keeping capital costs 
low, numerous legislative programs of deregulation were adopted during 
these years. The effect of these programs was, however, mostly felt in the 
eighties. 
Examples are numerous. In air travel, first came the disappearance of the 
single- price airfare, always and at any time the same, and the proliferation 
of cheap restricted fares, an event that helped airline traffic grow into a 
mass-market phenomenon in ways that it never had been before. Then came 
bankruptcies, consolidation, and the development of a hub-and-spoke route 
system that worked both to lower costs and to make new entry difficult, 
but allowed smaller niche players to emerge. A similar pattern developed 
in both truck and rail transport: lower costs, fewer, larger firms as a result 
of bankruptcy and merger, and small specialists. In all three areas a large, 
government-stabilized cartel was succeeded by a smaller oligopoly. 
In communication and finance the sequence was different and the time 
frame longer, but the end point was much the same. First came lower prices – 
the decline in long-distance rates and the abolition of fixed commissions on 
stock trades – and then a great proliferation in new services: call waiting 
and cell phones, interest-bearing checking accounts, and automatic teller 
machines. Eventually came consolidation into seeming oligopolies, though 
in these cases less through bankruptcy and more through merger. 
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The effect on the economy from deregulation was not quite what the 
theory predicted. Prices did decline for most consumers, except for the 
road warriors of corporate sales departments who shifted from long boring 
rides in large comfortable cars ending at indifferent motel rooms to shorter 
cramped flights, boring waits in airports, and short drives in cramped rental 
cars ending at indifferent motel rooms. More significantly, however, in each 
deregulated industry the product or service seemed to change over time. 
The simplest example is rail and truck transport where the transforma-
tion of industry structure combined with the potential of computerization 
to produce “just in time” manufacturing and retailing, a concept that signif-
icantly reduced inventory costs and eliminated dozens of local distributors. 
Trucks, rail cars, and ocean freight containers, always on the move, in effect 
became the inventory function, serving as rolling warehouses. Similarly, in 
communication first the fax machine, then the dial-up modem, and finally 
cable and wireless technology, again combined with the potential of com-
puterization, transformed the humble phone call into something else – a 
document delivery service, an information-retrieval mechanism, a “real-
time” financial transactions network. These changes transformed the phone 
into bandwidth to be used for purposes essentially unrelated to inviting 
neighbors over for dinner and a friendly game of cards. Likewise in banking 
and securities, the proliferation of products that are neither deposit tak-
ing nor lending nor the purchase and sale of debt or equity interests in 
business entities – bank cards, money market mutual funds, securitization, 
currency hedging, interest rate swaps – have created what can be seen as a 
new industry, rather grandiosely called financial services. 
A significant portion of the economic growth in the late eighties and 
nineties came in these areas, though not without costs, often enormous, 
for the political process failed to realize that regulation creates patterns of 
investment, and so of personal commitment, that are upset when regulation 
is removed. In the securities industry predictable and promising careers 
ended and famous firms were swallowed whole, as competition created the 
need for new products and new skills. In railroads, the casualties were other 
industries that, and people who, had located in particular places and there 
depended on the existence of a particular mode of transportation that was 
no longer economical to maintain and so disappeared. 
In bank regulation the matter was more complicated and ultimately 
expensive, but again had its roots in the seventies. The Great Inflation 
brought an enormous increase in unregulated interest rates. Soon there were 
complaints across the land that savings deposits were “eroding” because they 
were earning a regulated low return, a rate far below the rate of inflation. To 
make matters worse, the development of the money market mutual fund, a 
device that invested cash in short-term Treasury obligations and similar 
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debt instruments of the most credit-worthy commercial borrowers – 
commercial paper – offered savers a heftier return than could savings 
accounts, because the rates on these investments were not regulated. In 
pursuit of such returns, savings poured out of deposit institutions. Savings 
and loans found that they lacked money for making new mortgages. Banks 
found that demand for corporate loans had declined as corporate treasurers 
issued the commercial paper that the money market funds craved, rather 
than visiting their local banker. 
The initial governmental response to this problem was to allow commer-
cial banks to offer interest on checking accounts and the savings and loan 
industry to offer higher rates on its deposits. The banks, left with a riskier 
portfolio of loans made to borrowers whose credit was not good enough for 
the commercial paper market, moved heavily into fee-generating business 
to pay for the now more expensive deposits. The savings and loans had 
a more embedded problem; the interest rates they were now paying for 
deposits were substantially higher than the interest rates on the portfolio 
of thirty-year mortgages they had made over time and still held. Thus, 
although these institutions had funds to loan, they were losing money with 
each transaction. Two changes followed. 
The first was a great success, the invention of the collateralized mortgage 
obligation (CMO). Financial institutions would sell their mortgages to the 
New Deal’s federal mortgage organizations – the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae). These organizations had long sold their own bonds to provide funds 
that could be lent to the providers of home mortgages. Now they began to 
issue similar securities, CMOs, with their own, extremely valuable guar-
antee and moreover collateralized by the newly purchased mortgages. This 
set of transactions allowed financial institutions to shift the risk of owning 
mortgages with fixed long-term rates to institutions with less sensitivity 
to interest-rate shifts, such as pension plans and insurance companies. 
The other was anything but a success. In the name of maintaining fair-
ness between different types of financial institutions, savings and loans were 
permitted to engage in lending other than home mortgages with the hope 
that they would earn the greater returns that those forms of lending pro-
vided. This decision was followed by the savings and loan crisis of the late 
eighties, as savings and loans around the country folded because of bad, 
occasionally even corrupt, investments or continuing “negative spreads” 
between deposit interest rates and mortgage portfolio returns, or both. The 
Treasury paid out billions on the claims presented by depositors who lost 
their savings in the process, an obligation that derived from the provision 
of deposit insurance, one of the little programs of the New Deal that had 
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successfully enticed deposits back into a banking system that had imploded 
in the twenties and thirties. 
Deregulation was, however, only a part of what was going on in the 
economy in the eighties and nineties. Much of the rest was the continued 
destruction of the economic model that had made the fifties economy such 
a spectacular thing, probably by accident, by being the right model for that 
particularly unforeseeable time. Increasingly, the associationalist model of 
high prices, high wages, and lifetime employment, at least for white-collar 
workers, came undone in a range of industries, whether trade protected 
or not. Copper, tires, textiles, clothing, shoes, televisions, stereos, dishes, 
glassware, cookware, watches, pens, and even telephones slowly became 
mostly imported products; autos, somewhat less. Manufacturers contin-
ued the process of first conceding the low-end products, then the oldest 
manufacturing facilities, and finally whole markets. 
In some areas technological innovation or the development of new 
processes entirely – steel mini-mills using scrap for feedstock is a good 
example – kept parts of old industries alive. But more than occasionally, 
these were markets where manufacturing costs were not yet matched by 
foreign producers. In still other markets, a slimmed-down industry sur-
vived in niches – autos that are particularly designed for the odd tastes 
of the American consumer or specialty steels. What was left behind was a 
landscape surprisingly denuded of former industrial icons, except for a few 
long-term survivors. IBM, as well as Boeing and the rest of the aerospace 
industry, are the most obvious; General Motors and Ford, the most recur-
rently troubled. Even the conglomerate alternative to the fifties industrial 
behemoths passed from the scene, a victim of the eighties junk bond craze 
that facilitated busting up such entities for fun and profit. 
As one examines this record of the decline of heavy industry, it becomes 
apparent that the broad increase in the standard of living that took place in 
the fifties and early sixties has been America’s own version of the winner’s 
curse. Although Americans have always searched for new markets and so 
have been alive to the world of international trade, free trade, and thus the 
idea of comparative national advantage, has been a more central part of the 
national consciousness since World War II. Free trade, really freer trade, 
was to be a way to avoid the recurrence of the Depression, to unite nations 
by means of growing mutual dependency, and to provide an object lesson 
for the Third World of the benefits of “open” economies, in contrast to the 
“closed” Communist economies in Eastern Europe and Asia. Foreign policy 
thus supported freer trade, though at times domestic considerations made 
freer trade look more like trade managed for strategic national advantage. 
Freer trade interacted with the American standard of living in a crucial 
way. As the United States became less of an island, less capable of standing 
Law and Economic Change During the Short Twentieth Century 591 
separately, maintaining the standard of living that was built in a high-wage, 
high-price economy became more difficult. In response to that difficulty, 
Americans, fighting to remain a part of the enlarged middle class, did 
many things. They drastically curbed saving. They supported tax reduction, 
borrowing from an uncertain future. They chose to try to stretch the dollar 
by working harder; the growth of the two wage-earner household during 
the seventies and eighties surely cushioned economic decline for families 
who found that local industrial jobs had disappeared. And they found it 
easy to continue to accept, indeed to increase their acceptance of, lower cost 
imports from an international arena with which they were familiar and in 
which they were comfortable, if not wholly dominant. That arena became 
the source for the goods that were necessary for membership in the lower 
middle class and above. 
Of course, because of America’s economic dependence on imported oil – 
environmental concerns, again a part of a middle-class standard of living, 
have kept coal and nuclear power from being winners – and because of 
American’s addiction to computers and consumer electronics, there was 
really no other plausible choice than freer trade. Letting the dollar become 
a reserve currency, indeed even exulting in its becoming such, was, like 
the middle-class standard of living, a mixed blessing. It made trade easy, 
but it made investment easy as well. The interest equalization tax had a 
hidden lesson in it. Capital does seek its highest returns consistent with its 
tolerance for risk. 
Once the value of major currencies was no longer tied to a stock of 
gold, numerous investment opportunities, denominated in various curren-
cies, became real alternatives. Looked at critically, returns on investments 
denominated in dollars simply did not stand up to those available else-
where. And so, those American firms that could move their funds around 
the world found that more promising investments in plant and equipment 
were to be had elsewhere. Often these investments were made simply in 
pursuit of lower labor costs. At other times, investments were in new pro-
duction processes, especially those substituting lighter weight components 
for heavier, since the modest increase in the cost of production was less 
than the decrease in the cost of ocean freight and so the resulting product 
was still salable in the United States. Though investment in new plant 
and equipment was concentrated elsewhere, buying was still an available 
alternative for middle-class Americans addicted to their standard of living; 
increasingly, manufacturing was not. 
There was, as often is the case, a counter-current. Ours was still the 
largest economy in the world, though the expanding European Union was 
trying to overtake us. Our addiction to a fifties standard of living main-
tained with imported goods meant that foreign producers rapidly acquired 
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great piles of dollars, for most the reserve currency of choice. Those earnings 
had to go somewhere. Mattresses were implausible and conversion to for-
eign currencies would only result in a decrease in the value of the earnings. 
So, many producers of imported goods used their dollars to make portfo-
lio investments in New York, the largest and deepest securities market in 
the world; to purchase tangible American assets, such as real estate, still 
viable manufacturing companies, or almost any service business; or to dupli-
cate their existing, overseas plant and equipment in the States, thus saving 
the transportation costs otherwise inherent in serving our market and simul-
taneously making their products more attractive to American customers. 
Oddly, what seemed to many observers to be a dangerous tendency to live 
well beyond our means proved to be not even a half-bad experience for many 
Americans. 
As the remnants of the fifties economy were being destroyed, a suc-
cessor economy was growing, developed out of America’s real economic 
strength – higher education. Computers and their software, pharmaceuti-
cals, health care products, electronic technology spinoffs from defense indus-
tries, advanced engineering processes – all were high-growth, high-return 
industries right here in America; all were significant sources of exports as 
well. It seemed as if Americans were going to do the world’s research and 
development. Production was another matter. All major (and a surprising 
percentage of minor) American corporations purveying consumer or indus-
trial goods had built or acquired many international facilities capable of 
producing goods for local markets and for export to the United States. 
Production would increasingly be done elsewhere. 
Another source of growth was in the continuing expansion of service 
industries: banking, insurance, real estate, health care, “hospitality,” travel, 
and government. This was particularly true in the South and West, areas that 
had already increased their light-manufacturing base and so could support 
a similarly increased population. In Florida and in the Southwest, where the 
natives had expanded water supplies through transport by canal, growing 
numbers of retirees fueled still larger increases in the size of the service econ-
omy. In a real sense, service jobs too were a product of the American system of 
education, though not necessarily one to be proud of, filled as they were by a 
small number of college and professional degree holders and a large number 
of others who at best held associates degrees and were paid accordingly. 
These examples of growth were obvious in that other notable product 
of the American educational system – the financial services industry. The 
proliferation of new and modestly useful financial products coming out of 
Wall Street’s version of Hollywood’s dream factories that took advantage 
of the breadth and depth of the American capital markets and tapped into 
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international markets as well made many men (but few women) rich. In 
the process, the financial engineering that Wall Street delivered to the var-
ious “institutions” that increasingly came to dominate American financial 
markets – insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, the private 
foundations of the wealthy, university endowments and, let us not forget, 
hedge funds – transformed the financial landscape. Where once a solid div-
idend record was all that counted when measuring a stock’s attractiveness, 
now institutions – many so large that they would find it very hard to sell 
their holdings in any given stock and others limited in their ability to 
do so by their choice to pursue indexing as an investment strategy – gave 
attractiveness an entirely new dimension, a dimension derived from the 
new high-growth, high-return industries. Total return, the sum of divi-
dends received and stock appreciation, was now the measure of investment 
success, that and steady earnings growth. All one heard was the demand for 
“increasing shareholder value,” a euphemism for raising a company’s stock 
price. 
So, at the end of the nineties the United States seemed to be left with an 
economy that consisted of the products of the American system of higher 
education; those things that were too heavy and too inexpensive to be 
effectively made and shipped from overseas; services that had to be delivered 
locally including construction; entertainment, always a viable industry for 
any cultural hegemon; autos, an industry kept alive by the growth of foreign 
manufacturers who, afraid of trade protection legislation, chose to use profits 
earned here to create plants producing for a market once served from abroad; 
and the sale of the myriad products that made up a middle-class lifestyle. 
While some argued that the industries reborn by deregulation had to be 
added to this list, it seemed more likely that, just as had proven to be the 
case with truck and rail transportation, unless the deregulated industries 
were tied to the products of the American system of higher education, their 
growth would prove to have represented one-time opportunities as, over 
time, the American preference for oligopolistic competition – a modest 
possibility of price control derived from branding and economies of scale, 
coupled with an endless fear of a competitor’s “breakout” innovation – 
asserted itself. 
To know something is to be able to name it. If the fifties instantiated 
an associationalist economy, what name properly describes the American 
economy at the end of the nineties? The decade did not see a return to the 
laissez-faire capitalism thought to have gripped the United States in the 
1890s. For all the complaints about the costs of regulation, environmental, 
food and drug, labor relations, occupational safety, pension, product safety, 
securities, and wage and hour protections did not wholly disappear. Social 
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Security and Medicare, as well as unemployment, bank deposit, pension, 
and brokerage failure insurance survived as well. The economy did not 
emulate the Gilded Age financiers and break into an orgy of unrestrained, 
to-the-death competition. Nor is it likely that it will. Oligopoly is too 
much a part of the American and world experience now. 
To understand the economy that emerged from the nineties, it is impor-
tant to notice how, during the decade, financial markets became incredibly 
disciplining. Companies had to deliver ever higher total returns on capital 
based on steady, predictable earnings growth or face pressure to cut losses 
quickly. This was an unforgiving economy, an economy where people with 
the labor market skills of the hour were pampered as never before, but 
only for as long as their star shone brightest. No longer associationalist, the 
American economy had become an impatient economy. 
The associationalist economy promised that economic growth would 
increase the availability of leisure; in response, some commentators even 
began to worry that so much leisure time would become a social problem. 
In the early twenty-first century all that is past; now there is no leisure time 
until retirement. The communications revolution means that the global 
stock market, which operates around the clock, can be checked at any time in 
the day or night while on safari in Africa. First, courier largely replaced real 
mail; in turn courier was replaced by fax; currently the on-time standards 
are email and text messaging, available essentially anywhere, anytime by 
mobile phone. Coast-to-coast and intercontinental flights are staples of 
commerce, where once the pace of train and ocean travel – both with real 
sleep caught on the way – was a break from the daily routine. Financial 
markets are driven, not by earnings trends, but by quarterly earnings, or 
even expectations about quarterly earnings; by expectations about the next 
Fed Open Market Committee meeting and not by the results of the meeting 
itself. The best production process is a “just in time” production process. 
Yes, in the early twenty-first century the American economy is an impatient 
economy. 
V. EXAMINING A LOOSELY WOVEN FABRIC: SEEKING LAW 
IN ECONOMIC CHANGE 
Whether one focuses on the details of economic life – dominant industries, 
modes of transportation, consumer products – or on larger scale phenom-
ena – the expansion of the consumerist middle class, the shift in sectional 
economies, the decline of the American island economy – or on the highest 
level of generality – an economy as a whole, a persistent market structure 
that fuses an understanding of economic life with patterns of behavior within 
economic, political, and social institutions, an associationalist or impatient 
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economy – the short twentieth century has been a time of significant eco-
nomic change. As such it is plausible to examine the role of law in economic 
change, first at the highest level, then at lower levels, by focusing on these 
2years. 
Forms of Law and Change from One Economy to Another 
I hope that by now I have provided sufficient evidence for my initial assertion 
that the institution that is law (the many and variable actions undertaken 
by lawyers and other governmental officials, the formal and effective norms 
originating from the practices of these individuals, and the systematic pre-
suppositions shared among them) did very little to bring about change from 
one economy to another. Though responding to distress when it wished, 
law mostly stood by and watched. Many changes happened; few might be 
traced from the actions, or back toward the reactions, of law. Capitalism as a 
form of economic organization seemingly went its merry way, complaining 
from time to time about law’s particular intrusions, but generally too busy 
earning profits while profits could be earned, all the while coping with 
changes in markets, to be much influenced by law. 
My assertion, contrary to so much of the received wisdom of law professors 
and legal historians alike, is not offered so much out of perversity, but in 
an attempt to get us beyond the legalism, the focus on the three forms of 
law enumerated above, that has infected the topic of law and economy for 
at least a century. That law in all three forms is important in the daily lives 
of humans is a proposition beyond question. That at times law attempts 
to have such an impact on lives is also true beyond peradventure. That it 
often fails of its intention is also reasonably clear. But great change, be it 
social, political, or economic, is not a matter for calculus – sum the impact 
of law on a large number of lives over the relevant range of years. Such 
change is not even a more irregular sum, but a qualitative experience that 
in retrospect is disjunctive, not additive, of this being a different time from 
some other, remembered or imaginatively recreated, time. 
2 Before doing so, it is important to note the futility of the task I undertake. Life is not 
lived in conventional academic boxes, even less the complex of lives that is a society at 
any time or times, place or places. Multivariate analysis makes sense only to the extent 
that all other things can be held constant, but they never manage to stay that way. 
More simplistic methods, such as mine, do not do the job of analysis any better, only 
differently. And so, as I attempt to separate “law” and “economy” in order to assess their 
respective roles in economic change, to separate the dancer from the music that together 
are the dance, I ask the reader to be tolerant of the intrusion of metaphor. It is, after 
all, a traditional way of capturing disparate elements into a readily, if only implicitly, 
understood whole. 
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To understand the way in which law mostly stands aside as economic 
change occurs, not for lack of trying, but because it is the creation of humans, 
cursed with memory and deficient in foresight, let us look sequentially at 
the role of the three forms of law as set forth in my story. Looking first at 
the systematic presuppositions of the law, it is clear that, as asserted many 
pages ago, the law of property, contract, and theft, of mine and thine, so 
structures capitalism that it is both impossible to notice and impossible to 
miss. The precise effect of this distinctive underpinning to economic life 
is, however, difficult to gauge when examining economic change. 
All change takes place within a systematic structure of law and is mod-
estly pushed in particular directions by the alternatives that law, thus under-
stood, makes possible. It is unquestionably true that, in the United States 
in the short twentieth century, the systematic structure of law made it dif-
ficult to conceive of a social democratic or communitarian alternative to 
any one of a range of capitalisms, much less a state socialist alternative. 
However, to identify this aspect of law as central to an understanding of 
its role in economic change is to reduce the question of change to a tauto-
logical one that assumes that the change from, for instance, capitalism to 
socialism is the only important economic change possible. For humans the 
lived experience of less momentous changes may seem just as significant; 
in any case, it is a dubious practice to try to understand an institution by 
looking at its participation in, or response to, the most extreme change 
imaginable. Less extreme changes are difficult enough to understand all by 
themselves. 
Although it is difficult to know what an agnostic scholar might conclude 
about the role of law in large-scale economic change under hypothetical 
capitalist alternatives or alternatives to capitalism, I rather doubt that he 
or she would conclude that law played a significant role in such change. 
The systematic structure of law is largely isomorphic with the particular 
political economy – capitalism, socialism, or whatever – in this or any other 
of the various countries of the North Atlantic world. To identify specific 
instances of law’s action or reaction surely is to pull individual threads out of 
a loosely woven fabric held together in so many other ways. For this reason 
I believe it is best to treat the patient, silent work of law seen as systematic 
structure as it appears to most economic actors, as invisible. 
Looking next at the second form of law – formal and effective norms – 
one can, of course, identify individual patches of law adopted for numerous 
reasons that turn out, often surprisingly, to be crucial supports for economic 
change, such as from an associationalist to an impatient economy. The 
expansion of the middle class was founded on the New Deal institutions 
that defined labor, housing, and finance in these years. The GI Bill and Cold 
War military expenditures did their part as well, as did the great growth of 
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state university systems in the sixties. The shift in sectional economies was 
similarly founded on New Deal labor, agricultural, and industrial policies 
and on the concentration of new federal military and allied manufacturing 
resources in the South and West during World War II. The rise of the 
international economy of the last quarter of this century was founded on 
the multilateral financial and trade institutions established as part of the 
American strategy for an integrated postwar world, as well as on Marshall 
Plan aid. 
However, no institution of law acted with even the vague intention 
of expanding the middle class as part of the development of a consumer 
society. Similarly, to the limited extent that wartime expenditures were 
designed to counteract the colonial nature of the Southern or Western 
economy, no one simultaneously wished to hasten the decline of heavy 
manufacturing in the Northeast, much less to shift the country as a whole 
toward a service economy. And, though the postwar financial and trade 
institutions and Marshall Plan aid were designed to foster international 
trade, the major point of that effort was to limit the possibility of renewed 
conflict in Europe, not to transform the international economy as a whole 
and American participation in it in particular. Thus, it is not wholly clear 
what to make of these more specific underpinnings for change beyond seeing 
them as examples of the law of unintended consequences. Probably they were 
reasonably essential to the particular large-scale changes identified and yet, 
there will always remain the nagging doubt as to whether the absence of 
one or more of these bits of law would have made much of a difference in 
the shape of such changes, any more than would a change in one or more 
threads alter a loosely woven fabric. 
Looking finally at the third form of law – official action, the many and 
variable actions undertaken by lawyers and governmental actors – at least 
initially, this form seems more salient in the change from an associationalist 
to an impatient economy. Much of governmental effort directed toward 
managing economic life, both domestically and internationally, takes the 
form of, in the traditional language of the law, discretionary action. Lawyers 
worked endlessly to steer discretionary action and, when unable to do so, 
to avoid its objectives. This is the world of fiscal and monetary policy and 
international economic institutions, the world where economic historians 
argue about whether the Smoot-Hawley tariff really caused the Depression 
or whether Paul Volcker’s actions to break the Great Inflation were effective 
in doing just that. 
Clearly, Lord Keynes was right that such actions are of some causal sig-
nificance. The question is how much and in what direction. The Kennedy 
tax cuts and Johnson’s guns and butter (and no new taxes) policy clearly 
made a difference. But, it is not clear that they did more than provide very 
598 John Henry Schlegel 
welcome life support for an economy built on an associationalism that was 
already facing problems with which it would be unable to cope. Similarly, 
twenty years of determined anti-inflationary policy, husbanded by both Paul 
Volcker and Alan Greenspan, made it easy for the United States to build 
its position as the broadest, deepest source of capital worldwide and, as 
the possessor of a reasonably solid currency available in large amounts, the 
effective central bank for the world. Still, it is not obvious that this tena-
cious policy preference did anything toward building a vital international 
economy other than speed up that process a smidgen by modestly lowering 
the cost of funds for the actors who were creating that economy, adding 
an occasional thread to, or adjusting an existing one in, the loosely woven 
fabric. 
Gathered together, what all three forms of law – systemic presupposi-
tions, formal and effective norms, and official action – seem to have done in 
the change from an associationalist to an impatient economy is to augment 
the prevailing winds, but modestly. Thus, the expansion of the middle 
class was aided by expenditures for schools and colleges, the development 
of urban road networks, permissive zoning for subdivisions and shopping 
areas, and the indexation of Social Security benefits. The shift in sectional 
economies was aided by the development of the interstate highway system, 
funding of the infrastructure necessary for expanded airline travel, tolera-
tion of sectional wage differentials, and the expansion of electrical capacity 
to support air conditioning in Sunbelt climates. And the rise of the inter-
national economy was aided by export incentives, policies favoring limited 
taxation of foreign income, support for the waterfront infrastructure nec-
essary for containerized shipping, the relentless pursuit of tariff reduction, 
and support for the push by domestic banking and securities industries into 
foreign markets and for the creation of friendly domestic markets for foreign 
borrowers and investors. The contribution of the International Monetary 
Fund in attempting to stabilize currencies should not be underestimated 
either. 
Now, none of these were trivial actions, and logically all could be inverted 
into a refusal to respond to claims for aid from those harmed by each of these 
actions. But all were at the time seen as “no big deal.” Indeed, several of these 
actions taken by law do not even rate mention in any brief history of the 
American economy for these years. All might have been recognized as posing 
difficult problems at the time they were undertaken, but were not. Instead, 
they were seen as presenting no significant issues beyond the narrowly 
partisan ones. Their taken-for-grantedness is the key to understanding law’s 
actions in these cases. What is taken for granted, what is merely a matter 
of course, is that which seems most natural, least controversial, in the eyes 
of the recognized participants in the “pointless bickering” about law and 
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economy that always swirls throughout any governmental apparatus. And 
so, I believe it sensible to see such actions as no more than reinforcing 
large-scale change. 
Why then is it that the best that law in its three forms can do in the face 
of the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” of capitalism is to augment 
the prevailing winds? Let me recapitulate. First, it is reasonably appar-
ent that both economic and legal actors, to the extent that they may be 
more than formally distinguished, have at best a highly imperfect under-
standing of either economy or law at a given time and place. Second, this 
highly imperfect understanding is not the singular result of ideological 
blinkering, though, of course, all actors are both aided and limited in their 
vision as a result of shared or separate ideologies. Rather, both systems – 
economic and legal – are significantly more complicated than most actors 
are capable of understanding. At the same time, both systems are far more 
subject to perturbations that these same actors believe are external to the 
systems than most of them can conceive. Third, economy and law are also 
significantly more integrated than these actors realize, particularly with 
respect to the legal infrastructure, both doctrinal and institutional, that 
silently undergirds and channels economic activity and with respect to the 
durable patterns of economic life that are instantiated by the humans who 
are economic actors in all senses of that phrase – consumers, workers, manu-
facturers, retailers, financiers, and the like. Thus, the failure of law to direct 
or to respond to large-scale economic change is not a failure to act on the 
dictates of intellect or even a failure of will, as Willard Hurst may seem to 
argue, but a reflection of the limited ability of humans fully to understand 
these two complex systems, a reflection not of policy failure, but of human 
fallibility, as it were. 
Three Attitudes Apparent in Law’s Response to Smaller Scale Economic Change 
That law can do little but add to the steady winds of large-scale economic 
change does not mean that it cannot and so does not act, occasionally signif-
icantly, at the level of smaller, more narrowly focused change. Here, where 
actors can see more clearly, where the impact on the lives of Americans 
is more obvious, law should be able to pay attention to the consequences 
that economic change brings. And consequences there are. Any significant 
change in an economy – expansion or contraction, domestic or interna-
tional, technological innovation or climatic alteration – will benefit or 
harm identifiable, limited segments of that economy – producers, financial 
or commercial intermediaries, transporters, sellers, workers, consumers – in 
a systematic way. Those who are harmed by such change routinely respond 
by seeking support to maintain their present, or regain their previous, 
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economic position from whatever piece of the modern state that seems to 
them likely to offer such assistance – administrative, executive, judicial, or 
legislative. Sometimes the support sought will be forthcoming, though not 
necessarily in the form requested, and at other times such support will not 
be forthcoming. Oddly, even when such support is forthcoming, the sup-
port provided will only sometimes have the anticipated effects, and when 
the support is denied, the absence of support will only sometimes bring 
forth the anticipated consequences. Such is the recurrent, less than wholly 
helpful, pattern experienced by those who would go to law. 
Despite the essential indeterminacy of law’s reaction to smaller scale 
economic change, a few underlying attitudes can be teased out. I can iden-
tify three of them – law’s general attitude toward change, its attitude 
toward technological as opposed to cost-driven change, and its attitude to-
ward system-wide change. First, with respect to law’s general attitude 
toward smaller scale economic change, it is important to remember that 
there are three possible answers that law might regularly give when eco-
nomic actors seek its aid – stonewall change, support it indiscriminately, 
or slow it down somewhat. 
Consider stonewalling. Law might choose to stonewall change and so 
give complete support to existing, and so entrenched, potentially politically 
powerful, economic interests. It is actually hard to find examples of such a 
response of law in the short twentieth century. Most are reasonably obscure; 
none merits mention in my story. Some instances can be supplied, however, 
such as the refusal to eliminate the role of the liquor wholesaler after changes 
in transportation made it plausible for many large producers to do so or the 
surprisingly long refusal of law to respond to the demands of the railroads 
to countenance elimination of a fireman on a train after diesel engines had 
replaced coal fired engines, or of the brakeman after the airbrake replaced 
the hand brake. 
Next consider indiscriminate support. Law’s response to smaller scale 
economic change might be to choose to favor change essentially indiscrim-
inately and so ignore entrenched economic interests. This response of law 
is less remarkably rather difficult to find. However, the continuing effort 
of the Supreme Court to see that out-of-state mail order retailers do not 
have to pay the same local corporate and sales taxes as in-state retailers is a 
conspicuous exception. Oddly, the record on atomic power might be seen 
to provide a double example of this response as law first ignored the objec-
tions of the owners of existing coal-fired plants and then, when the political 
winds changed, ignored the interests of the owners of the new atomic power 
plants. 
Consider finally a modest slowing of smaller scale change. Law might 
choose to work to retard change somewhat, but not to block it. Such a course 
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of action would allow entrenched interests to work down their investments 
over time – to avoid the economist’s seemingly heartless notion that sunk 
costs are sunk and so everyone should move on. Instead, such interests might 
recover at least a further part of their investments in monetary or personal 
capital, though it should be remembered that the risks faced by monetary 
capital can in theory, and at times in practice, be diversified much easier 
than those faced by personal capital. Equally importantly, by allowing a 
work down of sunk costs, law might buy off those political interests that 
would most stridently oppose change and, in doing so, might indirectly 
facilitate such change. This is actually the response most often evident in 
my story. 
The best examples are relatively recent. The entire panoply of trade 
protection legislation has the structure of providing short-term respites for 
industries suffering from the effects of foreign competition, which, though 
always defended as providing the industry a chance to get its house in order, 
are all but invariably followed by a decline in the size of the industry in 
question. Here steel, textiles, and apparel are the classic cases. The same is 
true of the negotiation of bi- or multilateral “voluntary export restraints,” 
programs whereby foreign countries agree to hold their company’s exports 
down to some level experienced at an earlier time for a certain period of 
years. Here autos, steel, and again textiles (the multi-fiber agreements) are 
equally classic cases, where on expiration of the agreement, again justified 
as allowing the industry to get back on its feet, somehow the industry is 
smaller. 
A second attitude disclosed in law’s response to smaller scale economic 
change, one that clearly overlaps with its more general response to such 
change, can be seen by separately considering technological change, usu-
ally domestic in origin, and cost-driven change, usually foreign in origin. 
Examples of the former within the short twentieth century would be the 
extension of electric power to more and more homes; the development of 
commercial radio, television, and the personal computer; and the building 
of an effective airline passenger transportation network. This kind of change 
alters the way that Americans as consumers can live their lives, spend their 
time, envision their world; for them the change is visible but unproblem-
atic. Examples of the latter would be the growth of textile manufacturing 
in Asia and Central America, of export-oriented automobile manufacturing 
in Europe and Asia, of similarly oriented electronics manufacturing in Asia, 
of natural resources production in the South America and the Mideast, or 
of computer programming skills in South Asia, instances where foreign 
producers possess a comparative cost advantage. With this kind of change 
lives remain much the same for most American consumers; the change is 
almost invisible and almost equally unproblematic. 
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For domestic producers – both capital and labor3 – of the same or of 
alternative goods or services, the matter is entirely different. It makes no 
difference to them whether change is technological or cost driven. These 
are the people identifiably harmed by change whatever its source; these 
are the people who will go to law for relief. The governmental response to 
the economic dislocations felt from both types of change might therefore 
be expected to be identical, given that the vast mass of consumers, the 
ostensible public of the public interest, is not obviously harmed by either. 
However, this turns out not to be so. Law will be more supportive of 
those whose lives are threatened by cost-driven change than of those who 
are threatened by technological change. Possibly, change in the way that 
Americans as consumers can live their lives, spend their time, envision their 
world makes it difficult to harness empathetic concern for those whose 
economic lives are harmed by this expansion in a consumer’s surround. 
Definitely, the foreign invader is a more acceptable target than the domestic 
insurgent. 
Good examples can be found of law’s reaction to these two kinds of change. 
Consider first cost-driven change. In steel and autos, producers began by 
ignoring, then disparaging, the foreign-made goods, and finally ceding the 
lowest (and, on occasion, highest) margin products. When foreign producers 
were recognized as a real competitive threat to the investments of both 
capital and labor, a hue and cry went up to “save” the industry – in both 
cases an industry with complacent management and poor labor relations. 
Law repeatedly responded with temporary measures as the industry slowly 
shrunk in size, though in autos, after foreign manufacturers established 
domestic plants, claims for assistance went largely unanswered. 
Textiles and apparel, including shoes, provide an interesting contrast, as 
does consumer electronics. Here the initial pattern of management behav-
ior was roughly the same as steel and autos; the response of law was not. 
3 It is perhaps foolish for me to use the classic nineteenth-century language of capital and 
labor when writing about owners and workers in the short twentieth century. Capital 
comes in many varieties. Portfolio investment of varying kinds and sizes; productive 
physical assets of bewildering types and ages, owned in diverse ways by people in 
quite diverse circumstances; a similarly diverse range of real estate investments; owner-
occupied homes and their contents; and of course the varying types of human capital – 
might be considered a good start at a comprehensive listing, but nothing more. Similarly, 
labor ranges from the chronically unemployed through day laborers, union and non-union 
hourly workers in various settings, a similarly diverse group of salaried workers, to various 
freelance artisans and professionals who might be either workers or worker/owners. 
To attack this problem of understanding the contemporary structure of capital and 
labor would require an entirely separate article. As I am comfortable with the classic 
language because it ought to remind readers of significant questions of dependence and 
independence, I have chosen to maintain it. 
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Textiles received the most continuous support – perhaps a function of the 
concentration of the industry in the Southeast, where Congressmen tend 
to serve long and reach high positions in party leadership and maybe also 
a recognition of the continuous, significant investments in manufactur-
ing technology made by the industry. In consumer electronics, television 
manufacturers received some support, but by the time the Walkman rein-
vented the radio, domestic manufacturers had moved their own production 
offshore, law’s support ceased, and the market was quickly dominated by 
foreign products. In apparel, domestic producers were largely at the mercy 
of the branded apparel marketers, particularly in women’s wear. Here, little 
effective opposition to foreign incursions was mounted and so law’s response 
was weakest, for the marketers quickly outsourced manufacture to the very 
areas where the threatening off-brand goods were originating. 
The strength of these examples can be seen by comparing them to similar, 
but domestic, changes in technology. As the computer replaced the busi-
ness machine, the electric replaced the manual typewriter, and the Xerox 
machine replaced various duplication processes from carbon paper through 
stencils to thermofax, competitors either adapted or died. Mostly they died. 
As television replaced radio, radio struggled, gave up live entertainment, 
and finally reinvented itself as a purveyor of recorded music. Foreign, cost-
based insurgencies brought forth a response when domestic, technologically 
driven ones did not. Capital is anything but xenophobic; this is not true of 
humans more generally. 
A third attitude disclosed in law’s response to smaller scale economic 
change, a pattern that again overlaps with the two previously considered, 
can be seen by examining a third type of economic change – system-wide 
change, boom or bust. Examples of this kind of change would be the great 
bust known as the Depression, the fifties and nineties booms and the Great 
Inflation. This kind of change tends to treat most, though never all, produc-
ers and consumers alike, as would the proverbial rising or falling tide. One 
might expect that the kind of economic change that is broadly felt would 
bring forth a similarly broad governmental response. However, system-wide 
change tends to bring forth governmental responses that are less uniform 
and broad based than narrow and targeted and are highly influenced by the 
political exigencies of the time. 
The response of law to the Depression provides a well-known example. 
Although one can understand the New Deal’s focus on agriculture and 
financial institutions, given the collapse in farm and stock prices and the 
raft of mortgage foreclosures and bank failures, other aspects of the Roosevelt 
administration’s program are odd. Consider the relative exclusion of railroad 
aid. The high point of railroad domination of transportation was 1916. 
After that point the quantity of railroad trackage declined and competition 
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from inter-city bus lines became serious. During the Depression a large 
percentage of trackage was in receivership. Yet more of law’s attention was 
paid to civil aviation, marginal for both passenger and cargo transportation, 
and to trucking as well. 
Natural resources industries were treated no more uniformly. Coal min-
ing, incredibly depressed from the decline in industrial production and the 
slow increase in residential and commercial oil heating; dependent on the 
railroads, both as a customer and a transporter; and possessed of a strong, if 
troubled, union tradition was lavished attention as a “sick” industry, even 
receiving its own separate New Deal statute and so its own Supreme Court 
declaration of unconstitutionality. Oil, where state-supported pro-rationing 
of production still could not avert a price decline, was similarly supported 
with federal legislation, though oil field and refinery workers were not 
comparably powerful and the industry was substantially less essential to 
the national economy, even given the growth of auto transportation, than 
the railroads. Other mining industries, as well as timber, all a matter of 
natural resources, were mostly ignored once the NRA fell apart, only to be 
declared unconstitutional thereafter anyway. 
Autos and steel were possibly not as depressed as coal, all things being 
relative anyway, but were just as crucial to the economy and shared an equally 
troubled history of labor relations. They received no special attention, nor 
did any other manufacturing industry. And even agriculture was treated 
spottily. Grains were lavished with law’s attention, but meat, poultry, and 
fish production were largely ignored. Cotton got included in crop subsidies, 
but not wool. Beans were ignored, and potatoes too, but rice, another starch, 
though hardly a centerpiece of the northern European culture that shaped 
this nation, received support as did sugar. 
Now, all of these seeming anomalies can be explained by a combination of 
political and economic analysis. But the need for such is precisely the point. 
Despite broad-based economic distress, broad-based legislative support for 
the economy was not forthcoming. 
The Great Inflation of the sixties and seventies equally illustrates this 
proposition. That law paid enormous attention to oil and natural gas pro-
duction and pricing during these years is again easy to understand; the two 
oil price shocks and one embargo gained the attention of an auto-dependent 
nation in nothing flat. Similarly, currency and balance of payments ques-
tions were of daily concern given the abandonment of the gold standard 
and the much increased price of imported oil. But in a virtual repeat of the 
Depression, banking, securities, and agriculture all received major attention 
from law, as did commercial aviation and trucking. The big shift in law’s 
attention was the railroads, a clear response to the Penn-Central bankruptcy 
that led to the formation of Conrail and Amtrak. Yet, except for steel and 
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autos, manufacturing was again largely ignored, as was most of agriculture, 
except for the historically favored crops. Consumer prices received attention 
with Nixon’s price control plan in the early seventies, but before and after 
that event, ordinary Americans were basically left to lump it. 
The similarity of the pattern of economic sectors attended to and ignored 
forty years apart suggests certain durable features to law’s instantiation of 
the politics of the economy. The continued political attention paid to the 
economic interests dependent on law for the definition of their powers, such 
as banking and securities, or dependent on law for their current economic 
value, such as agriculture or natural resources, is not surprising. At the same 
time such interest does not translate into narrow attainment of economic 
desires, much less stability. The success of the savings and loan industry in 
securing law’s ministrations led to the industry’s demise. And the banking 
industry prospered, if not beyond, at least up to, its wildest dreams, through 
a period in which its greatest legislative desire – the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act – was beyond its reach. 
In some ways, more important than the durability of law’s response to 
the politics of economy is the evidence that both the Depression and the 
Great Inflation provide of law’s limited range of attention where matters 
of system-wide economic change are concerned. The production, distribu-
tion, and consumption of manufactured goods, whether industrial or con-
sumer, seemingly the engine of economic life, were (except for the National 
Recovery Administration) largely ignored by law in cases of cyclical eco-
nomic change. Perhaps these activities are too diffuse to bring politically 
organized attention; perhaps they are too far removed from law’s regular 
concerns, except as a purchaser of military supplies or construction services; 
perhaps they are just too close to the heart of a capitalist economy. 
Three Contexts for Law’s Response to Smaller Scale Economic Change 
In addition to the three discernible attitudes disclosed in law’s response to 
smaller scale economic change, I can profitably examine three particular con-
texts for that response – infrastructural investment, regulatory investments, 
and social circumstances. Consider first infrastructural investments. One of 
the great, unheralded, and almost invisible legal inventions prominent in 
the short twentieth century is the public authority, an entity functionally 
similar to the eighteenth-century corporation. Originally it was nothing 
but a vehicle for evading state constitutional restrictions on state and local 
debt and still, of course, functions as such. A legal entity is formally estab-
lished as separate from its parent governmental unit, given building and/or 
purchasing and, most importantly, bonding authority. It is then set on its 
way to pursue the public good. Under the fiction that, as it is separate 
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from its parental authority, it is not bound by constitutional restrictions 
on the actions of the establishing entity, normally its objective is engaging 
in building or buying something using borrowed funds, the repayment of 
which is secured by some stream of revenue that the built or purchased asset 
is supposed to throw off. 
The best known of such entities established by a state or local government 
is the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, the centerpiece of Robert 
Moses’ New York empire. But such authorities also build and operate toll 
roads, canals, harbors, airports, transit systems, hospitals, dams and their 
power plants, convention centers, and sports arenas; they also build and then 
lease public housing, state universities and their dormitories, and defense 
plants. Creating such entities removes them somewhat from the rough and 
tumble of legislative and executive politics and even where debt restrictions 
are not constitutional, as is the case with the federal government, hides their 
debt a bit from public scrutiny. 
Public authorities are regularly established for the purpose of providing 
infrastructure investment that it is hoped will bring positive economic 
results for the relevant community. They are thus classic examples of law 
working either to rehabilitate deteriorating facilities or to build new ones 
and thus either to retard or to facilitate change. Three federally established 
public authorities – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae – figure 
reasonably large in my story; two others, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
and the Bonneville Power Authority, are also well known. All five were 
built to facilitate change; they and many others have served that objective 
remarkably well, if not exactly in the way initially envisioned. 
In contrast, most attempts to use public authorities to retard change, 
for example by rehabilitating decayed canal or port structures with the 
objective of bringing traffic back to the area, have been notable failures. 
Buffalo provides a good, if obscure, example. In the early fifties Buffalo 
ceased to be an important place for the trans-shipment of grain for flour 
milling and export as the mills were moved closer to Midwestern grain 
markets and as barge transit down the Mississippi to the redeveloped port 
at New Orleans became an increasingly feasible alternative to the older 
route to East Coast ports via freighter through the Great Lakes and rail 
thereafter. An increasingly decrepit and inactive waterfront mirrored the 
decline of Buffalo’s milling and trans-shipment activities, and so, a port 
authority was created to make the port more attractive. Soon thereafter the 
failure of the local surface transportation company brought the change of 
the port authority into a more general transportation authority that took 
over airport operations as well. Forty years later the result of these actions by 
law is instructive: a modest, but cheerful airport survives on landing fees; 
a surprisingly pleasant local transportation system limps along, despite 
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significant grant-based investment, as ridership decline follows population 
decline; and the port is still sad to see. It can’t possibly be rehabilitated 
because there is little reason for anyone to use it as lake freighter-dependent 
industry slowly disappears. So, almost no fee income is generated that might 
fund rehabilitation. 
A second context for examining law’s response to smaller scale economic 
change is in threats to regulatory investments, characteristically made as 
part of the legacy of various New Deal economic recovery programs. Tied 
to associationalism as they were, the New Deal economic programs tended 
to think of business relationships as static and so favored dividing markets 
in ways that, although they did not guarantee that profits would be made, 
did allow all existing participants to compete in gentlemanly ways within 
industry segments while keeping potential competitors happy with simi-
larly protected hunks of the overall economic “turf.” This policy is most 
obviously evident in the banking, insurance, and securities industries. It is 
also prominent in communications and transportation and can be seen in 
agricultural programs as well. 
The associationalist assumptions underlying economic policies in areas 
such as these create particular problems when the affected industries find 
that economic change, sometimes technological, at other times cost driven, 
undermines the assumed static structure of competition. This is because over 
time this structure becomes built into the valuation of existing investments 
and leads to making further investments whose value is similarly depen-
dent on the existing industry structure. How to unravel these investments 
fairly has bedeviled law for the past half-century. Two examples should 
suffice. 
American agricultural policy, like the postwar agricultural policy of other 
major European and Asian industrial states, is an incredible mess. Here, the 
New Deal agricultural policy trio of ascertainably rational but practically 
ineffective production controls – predicated on acreage under cultivation 
rather than total yield, crop subsidies that sustained the most depressed 
segments of the increasingly irrelevant agricultural past, and modest soil 
conservation programs – has persisted despite generations of otherwise with-
ering critique and through a period of extraordinary declines in the farm 
population and a technologically driven explosion in per acre productiv-
ity derived from increased use of expensive fertilizers, farm machinery, and 
hybrid crops. Although it is surely plausible that were the Senate elected 
in proportion to population, agricultural subsidies would be withdrawn, 
it seems to me that the continuing program less reflects the constitutional 
rule giving each state, regardless of population, two senators than it does 
the difficulty of withdrawing subsidies once they have been built into the 
fabric of economic assumptions that are farm valuation. 
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To withdraw subsidies imperils farm income, which imperils farm mort-
gages (and so ownership), which imperils farm mortgage lenders, a narrow, 
local branch of lending. Thus, what may be a rational economic plan for 
ending subsidies that in the long run may benefit agriculture and the entire 
national economy creates short-run problems that are extremely painful 
and threaten the owners of the existing farms, agricultural cooperatives, 
and financial institutions as well as farm communities, including not just 
farm implement dealers and feed, seed, and chemical sellers, but also auto 
dealers, grocers, schools, churches, and restaurants. Lacking the political 
will to buy existing beneficiaries out of their subsidies through a program 
of capital grants, and already having extended governmental guarantees 
under the program of mortgage insurance offered by Farmer Mac, the only 
politically palatable solution is hobbling along under an endlessly adjusted, 
obviously defective program.4 
The tangled story of the transformation of the segmented worlds of bank-
ing, insurance, and securities provides a modest counterpoint to the difficul-
ties with agricultural policy. The continuing breakdown of the segmented 
structure of these industries can be told either as a case of domestic insur-
gency, as each of these industries tried to escape from the straitjacket that 
was established during the Depression in the name of restoring confidence 
in the financial system, or as a case of a foreign insurgency, as the availability 
of more attractive foreign investments over times led to the unraveling of 
the New Deal financial order. And yet, rather than do nothing, as if the 
insurgent were domestic, or provide transitional support, as if the insurgent 
were foreign, law’s response in almost all cases was to expand the powers of 
the institution whose separate protected sphere was threatened by financial 
innovation.5 
Here again the long-standing set of economic controls created a set of 
investments whose value was significantly determined by the structure of 
regulation. Trying, though not necessarily succeeding, to maintain relative 
parity between industry segments was a response that served to protect 
the relative, though hardly the absolute, value of these regulatorily based 
investments. Thus, attempts to alter the income tax treatment of mutual as 
against stock insurance companies, where mutuals possessed a significant 
advantage, were never successful, but a change in the investment powers 
of one regularly led to a change in the investment powers of the other. 
Similarly, in the segmented world of banking, branching by commercial 
4 The recent case of tobacco acreage allotments is hardly an example to the contrary, for 
it took years of health concerns, unlikely to be reproduced elsewhere in agriculture, to 
overcome political opposition to such a “bailout.” 
5 The case of the deregulation of interstate trucking under the Motor Carriers Act is to 
the contrary. I cannot explain why. 
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and by mutual savings banks grew approximately apace, though in the 
former case most often by merger and in the latter case because of the legal 
form, most often by building new offices. The same is true of change across 
industry segments. Banks became able to sell securities only when securities 
firms were able to offer bank-like services through money market “wrap” 
accounts that allowed check-writing privileges. 
Of course, the most notorious examples of such attempts to maintain 
the relative value of regulatorily founded investments is the interaction 
between commercial banks and savings and loan associations – the savings 
and loan crisis, discussed previously. It began with the development of 
money market funds in the securities industry that drew deposits from a 
banking industry that was limited by law as to the interest it could pay on 
deposits. Eliminating these limits, the initial response, exposed the fact that 
the greater range of loans that commercial banks could enter into meant that 
they could earn more interest than could savings and loans that were limited 
to making residential mortgage loans. And so, these restrictions were lifted. 
An unpleasant cascade of events followed such well-intentioned actions. 
A third context for examining law’s response to smaller scale change 
can be identified by emphasizing certain social regularities in law’s actions. 
Indeed, some would say that law nearly always allows the capitalists to 
win. This notion, coming largely out of labor relations where it has some 
real bite, is more difficult to support in circumstances where law confronts 
economic change more generally. In such circumstances capital and labor, 
employers and employees, stand on both sides of the issue that law faces – 
favor old capital and labor or new. Each has a claim to law’s attention – 
the old, because of ties to the existing community; the new, because of its 
asserted but unprovable place in the economic future. 
As is evident from my story of economic change and from the preceding 
analysis, at least in the short twentieth century, law has tended to favor 
new capital, and derivatively new labor, because dreams are easier to spin 
than realities are to dress up. At times law does this by providing some 
transitional support for the past while facilitating a seemingly brighter 
future. At other times, not even transitional support is provided. However, 
there is a regularity, an identifiable pattern of winners and losers among 
those whose lives and fortunes are altered by smaller scale economic change. 
Not surprisingly, most often law is more effective when offering transitional 
support to capital than to labor. 
Examples are reasonably easy to identify. Consider, again, autos and steel. 
In both of these industries capital and labor received approximately the same 
protection from foreign competition. Indeed, labor arguably received more 
favorable treatment in that pension guarantee legislation extends protection 
to human capital that is unavailable to investment capital. Yet, there is no 
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great record of poor, demoralized stockholders in either the auto or steel 
industries as there is of poor, demoralized employees in those industries 
who never made it to retirement before their jobs disappeared. The reason 
is simple. The time horizon of capital, especially financial capital, but also 
bricks and mortar capital, is shorter that that of labor. Moreover, capital can 
diversify more readily to reduce risk. A working life is forty to fifty years and 
retraining to build new human capital investments becomes increasingly 
difficult after fifteen to twenty of those years. In contrast, a long horizon for 
the recovery of a capital investment is surely those same fifteen and twenty 
years, at which point dis- and re-investment are substantially easier. And 
over the last twenty years of the short twentieth century, the mean time 
horizon for capital recovery has surely shortened. Of course, capital losses 
in the early years before recovery is had are common, indeed more common 
than long-term recovery. And everyone who studies industry carefully has 
discovered stories of capital loss after long- term recovery that are every 
bit as devastating to the individual entrepreneur as are similar job losses 
to individual laborers. But in many, perhaps, most cases, capital has more 
accumulated assets to fall back on, and so equal treatment of human capital 
is anything but. 
VI. A MODEST CONCLUSION 
How then might the complex relationship between law and economic 
change, the change from an associationalist to an impatient economy, in 
the short twentieth century be summarized? Although law contributes lit-
tle to such large-scale change, again the great silent background of law that 
structures economic relations needs to be emphasized. Common assump-
tions about economic life under capitalism that are formalized as the rules 
of contract, tort, and property do their silent work. And as the winds of 
change blow and calm, so too do the institutions of law, including those 
that are commonly described as political, working as they do modestly to 
speed up change, to augment the prevailing winds. 
What then of the more active work of law, work carried on with respect to 
smaller scale change? Description of law’s response to the winds of change 
in terms of the great battle between laissez-faire and regulation that figures 
so prominently in the political rhetoric of both the left and the right in 
America is clearly inappropriate. In general, law favors neither position, but 
most commonly, but rather unsystematically, attempts to facilitate change 
by modestly retarding it. As it does so, it tends to be willing to respond 
more readily to economic harm suffered at the hands of foreign “invaders” 
of the allegedly national economic “turf” than of the domestic invaders of 
an individual industry’s “turf.” It pays more attention to segments of the 
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economy whose powers, or the value of whose investments, are dependent 
on law. Overall, it is more solicitous of new capital and labor than old, 
but even here, more to the harms suffered by capital than by labor. None 
of this ought to be surprising. Law, like other human institutions, works 
most often by half-steps that affirm the past while moving cautiously into 
the present and hiding from the future. Americans, like most humans, 
are notoriously xenophobic, however much they love their imported DVD 
players. And the United States is a capitalist, though hardly a free market 
capitalist, and definitely not a social democratic, economy. 
VII. CODA 
Readers have asked that I explain more precisely what I mean by “law” and 
so its relationship to “society” and “the/an economy,” as well as to flesh out 
the metaphor of the “loosely woven fabric.” I can do none of these things, 
but my readers deserve an explanation for that fact. 
Karl Llewellyn was fond of speaking of “law/government” as a way of elid-
ing the separation of “law” from “politics,” a separation that he believed to 
be unhelpful for analysis. I would be comfortable following his lead by elid-
ing my definitional problems through the use of the cognates “law/society” 
and “law/economy,” as I firmly believe that neither dichotomy is useful for 
understanding the subject I am trying to explicate (or any other subject 
either.) Unfortunately, I have learned that readers do not always accept such 
neologisms, as the soundless sinking of Llewellyn’s makes clear. I am fully 
aware that his academic profile was far higher than mine. So, I have largely 
resisted doing what would be comfortable for me and have decided to work 
within the only language that I have, a language in which “law” by defini-
tion is neither “the/an economy” or “society,” no matter how much I may 
wish them to be seen as deeply, inextricably intertwined. 
In the vain attempt to avoid this aspect of “the prison-house of language,” 
I have chosen to leave “law” and “an economy” but weakly demarcated (see 
italicized explanations offered at the outset of this chapter). I do not use 
“society” at all and leave “the economy” to a usage close to the rise and fall of 
the level of economic activity as well as the order and chaos experienced by 
participants in economic activity. In doing so, I have been able to focus on 
change in the form of, which is to say our understanding of, capitalism over 
time. By thus cabining usage I can present “law” and “an economy” as insep-
arable, except when analysis in the English language makes it impossible 
to avoid a usage that might imply to the contrary. 
I have tried to bridge the gap between my understanding of the relation-
ship between law and the/an economy and the usage available to me with 
a metaphor of the “loosely woven fabric.” I like this metaphor because, if 
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one pulls at too many threads in a loosely woven fabric, it rather quickly 
becomes a pile of thread and not a fabric at all. It is for this reason that I have 
not developed this metaphor extensively. Doing so would turn it into a pile 
of separate but entangled observations about “law” and “the/an economy” 
and it is just such a jumble that the metaphor is designed to avoid. 
I hope that readers have been able to be patient with the locutions I 
have adopted. Until we have a language that allows for the suppression of 
dichotomies such as law and politics, law and society, law and economy, 
such is the best that this writer can do. 
